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Articles
The Kimberley Process: Conflict
Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the
Universality Debate
Tracey Michelle Price"
"Diamonds are forever, it is often said. But lives are not. We
must spare people the ordeal of war, mutilations and death for
the sake of conflict diamonds."'
INTRODUCTION
At the hands of rebels, dictators, and terrorists, diamonds
have crystallized into a source of financing for conflict and civil
wars, which have caused the deaths of more than two million
people.2 These "conflict" diamonds have additionally threatened
to tarnish the legitimate diamond trade by associating dia-
monds with hardened brutality. The international community
has attempted to curb the trade of conflict diamonds and pro-
mote peace and stability in Angola, the Mano River Union
states,3 and the Great Lakes region 4 of Africa. In the last two
* LL.M. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1997, University of
Baltimore School of Law; B.A., University of Georgia. Admitted to practice in Mary-
land.
1. Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, at http://www.un.org/peace/Africa/
Diamonds.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2001) (quoting Martin Chungong Ayafor,
Chairman of the United Nations Sierra Leone Panel of Experts).
2. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/56 (2001); see also Clean Diamonds Act, H.R. 981, 107th Cong. § 2(1)
(2001).
3. The Mano River Union states include Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.
Michael Fleshman, "Conflict Diamonds" Evade U.N. Sanctions: Improvements in
Sierra Leone, But Continuing Violations in Angola and Liberia, AFR. RECOVERY,
Dec. 2001, at 15, available at http://www.UN.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol15no4/
154diam.htm. The Mano River Union was established pursuant to the Mano River
Declaration in October 1973 between Liberia's President William Tolbert and Sierra
Leone's President Siaka Stevens. Liberia: The Key To Ending Regional Instability,
ICG AFRICA REPORT No. 43, Apr. 24, 2002, at n.1 (Int'l Crisis Group, Free-
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years, international bodies have attempted to accomplish this
goal by devising a global certification scheme intended to oper-
ate as a blocking mechanism for conflict or blood diamonds.
Under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.), the certifica-
tion scheme has expanded into an unprecedented multilateral
effort involving more than thirty-five countries,6 the diamond
industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World
Diamond Council (WDC), 7 and the diamond trading community!
Named after the South African city of its origin, the "Kimberley
Process" (KP) will augment existing U.N. sanctions targeted at
preventing the trade of conflict diamonds. International imple-
town/Brussels). Guinea subsequently joined in 1977 under Sakou Tour. Id. The
union's purpose was "to build an economic and customs alliance and achieve a com-
mon market in which goods, services, and people would move freely across the re-
gion." Id.
4. The core of the Great Lakes region is comprised of the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA,
THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY 215 (2002).
5. Essential Elements of an International Scheme for Certification for Rough
Diamonds with a View to Breaking the Link Between Armed Conflict and the Trade
in Rough Diamonds § VI, para. 21, Kimberley Process Working Doc. 1/2002 (Mar.
20, 2002) [hereinafter KP Working Doc. 1/2002]; see Press Release, U.N. General
Assembly, General Assembly Urges Finalization of International Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds: Success of 'Kimberley Process' a Matter of Life and
Death For Southern Africa, Says Botswana as Assembly Adopts Text on Conflict
Diamonds, U.N. Doc. GA 10011 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.UN.org
News/Press/docs/2002/GA10011.doc.htm; see also Kimberly Process, at http://www.
kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
6. The following countries are KP Participants: Angola, Australia, Belgium,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Central African Republic, Cote
d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, France, Gabon, Germany,
Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Namibia, Portugal,
Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Switzer-
land, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Amboka Wameyo, An End to Conflict Diamonds?, ACTION
AID (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.actionaid.org/resources/pdfs/endconflict.doc.
7. The World Diamond Council (WDC) was created in July 2000 at a meeting
in Antwerp through a joint resolution of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses
and the International Diamond Manufacturers Associations. These two organiza-
tions represent the world's principal diamond manufacturing and trading centers.
Headquartered in New York, the WDC was created to represent the diamond indus-
try with respect to the development, implementation, and oversight of a tracking
system for conflict diamonds. See World Diamond Council, at http://www.world
diamondcouncil.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
8. See Annex to the Letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa
to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary-General: Provisional Report of the Kimberley
Process to the General Assembly, Submitted in Pursuance of Assembly Resolution
55/56 of 1 December 2000, U.N. Doc. A/56/502, App. B, at 7 (2001) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. A/56/5021. See generally Kimberley Process, supra note 5.
9. Diamonds from Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are subject to mandatory
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mentation of the Kimberley Process is tentatively scheduled for
the end of 2002.10
The U.N. defines conflict diamonds as those diamonds
originating from areas or mines that are controlled by rebel in-
surgents and factions that use the diamonds to fund military ac-
tion in opposition to legitimate governments.11 Diamonds from
Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), in particular, have fuelled rebellion and human rights
violations for at least a decade.12 More recently, a link between
these "dirty" diamonds and terrorist financing has increased in-
ternational commitment to addressing the conundrum of conflict
diamonds. 3
The KP will result in a memorandum of understanding or a
political agreement 4 regarding the trade of rough diamonds."
The agreement contemplates a system of national laws that
function interdependently to track rough diamonds from the
mines to the point they are first worked. 16 It will operate as a
UNSC sanctions, pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 1127 (1997), 1306 (2000), and 1343
(2001), respectively. See Angola (UNITA) Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 590
(2001); Illicit Diamonds, Conflict and Terrorism: The Role of U.S. Agencies in Fight-
ing the Conflict Diamond Trade: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Affairs, Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Alan W. Eastham, Special Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds, Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs) [hereinafter Government Affairs Hearing] (stating
that the KP will "supplement and enhance the Security Council measures").
10. Final Communique, Kimberly Process Meeting, Ottawa, 18 to 20 March
2002 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com [hereinafter KP
Final Communique].
11. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Urges States to
Implement Measures to Weaken Link Between Diamond Trade and Weapons for
Rebel Movements, U.N. Doc. GA/9839 (Dec. 1, 2000) (citing http://www.UN.org/
peace/africa/Diamond.html) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. GA/9839].
12. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, S. 2027 IS, 107th Cong. § 2(1) (2002).
13. Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade; Sale of Gems From
Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at Al;
see Government Affairs Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Alan W. Eastman, Spe-
cial Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs).
14. The draft KP agreement does not include the language typically used to
evidence an intention to enter into a formal treaty, such as the use of "shall,"
"agree," "obligations," or "enter into force." ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE 27 (2000). Additionally, its lack of formality, treaty-like final clauses,
or a registration requirement is strongly indicative that the KP agreement is a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or a political agreement. See generally id.
at 18, 26-46 (discussing the various distinctions between formal treaties and MOUs).
15. "Rough diamonds are diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved
or bruted, and fall under the Relevant Harmonized Commodity Description and Cod-
ing System [subheadings] 7102.10, 7102.21, and 7102.31." KP Working Doc. 112002,
supra note 5, § I.
16. See KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV.
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system of common minimum international standards for na-
tional certification regimes." All rough diamonds traded legiti-
mately will be accompanied by a certificate of origin. 18 These
certificates will be akin to a chain-of-custody warranty as the
rough diamonds are traded through the "diamond pipeline." 19 In
addition to the certificates, the nearly finalized KP agreement,2°
or "Working Document," requires nations to implement certain
controls and procedures that are not generally required with
simple "declarations" regarding origin.2'
The priority that the international community is placing on
controlling illicit diamond networks constitutes a major policy
reversal regarding conflict diamonds, which until 1999 were
largely ignored.2  Although the KP is widely endorsed, fashion-
ing a cure for the trade of conflict diamonds poses many com-
plexities. Some reluctant KP "Participants"23 have viewed the
certification scheme as an inadequate remedy.24 A central issue
17. U.N. Doc. A/56/502, supra note 8, at 2.
18. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV.
19. Id. The "diamond pipeline" refers to the stages that diamonds go through
before they reach retail stores. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
20. See Proposal for a Council Regulation Implementing the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for the International Trade In Rough Diamonds, COM (02) 455
final at 2 [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Regulation].
21. For example, Articles 501-503 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 (NAFTA), require certificates of origin for prod-
ucts traded between Canada, the United States and Mexico. Exporters may make a
declaration based on their own knowledge that the goods qualify as "originating
goods" under NAFTA. Id. Alternatively, they may rely on the representations of a
producer, if the certificate of origin appears valid on its face. See The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, ch. 5, (1993), available at 1993 WL
561140 N.A.F.T.A.; see also Steven W. Baker, NAFTA Verifications: New Concerns
for Exporters and Producers, 10 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 3 (2001) (discussing the
requirements of NAFTA producers and exporters in supplying goods to other
NAFTA countries in order to comply with NAFTA's country of origin verification
process).
22. Christian Dietrich, Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its Neighbors, (Partnership Africa Can-
ada, The Diamonds and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper No. 4), available
at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org.
23. The KP "Working Document," which is the basis for the final KP agree-
ment, defines "Participant" as "a state or regional economic integration organization
for whom the certification scheme is effective. Kimberley Process Working Doc.
1/2001, supra note 5, § I, at 4. A final definition of "Participant" is expected to be
agreed upon at the next plenary meeting schedule in November 2002. Proposal for a
Council Regulation, supra note 20, para. 9.
24. See Nicholas Shaxon, Transparency in the International Diamond Trade, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2001, at 214, 218, available at www.globalcorruption
report.org (stating that initially industry, confident that its way of doing business in
Africa was the status quo and believing that the U.N., not industry, had the obliga-
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of debate is whether the KP will constitute a trade barrier in-
consistent with the obligations imposed by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO).25 The Working Document states that Par-
ticipants should ensure that shipments of rough diamonds are
not "imported from or exported to a non-Participant."26 This re-
quirement effectively bars all non-participating countries from
the rough diamond trade. The United States, in particular,
views the prerequisite of universal implementation (the "univer-
sality requirement") as problematic because not all WTO Mem-
bers have agreed to be KP Participants.27 For this reason, some
nations, including the United States,2 s fear that the KP could
violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).29
tion of enforcing its own sanctions, first scorned NGO activists who brought conflict
diamonds to the attention of the media). This is a publication of Transparency In-
ternational, an anti-corruption NGO, which provides an overview of the state of
global corruption. See Transparency Int'l, at http://www.transparency.org (last
modified Sept. 24, 2002).
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS,
GAO-02-678, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN IN DETERRING
CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE 18 (June 2002), available at www.gao.gov; see also Gen-
eral Assembly Urges Finalization of International Certification Scheme for Rough
Diamonds, supra note 5.
26. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § III.
27. Of the WTO Members that are key rough diamond-producing and trading
countries, the following are not KP Participants: Austria, Barbados, Congo, Cyprus,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, The Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ire-
land, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela. An End to Conflict Diamonds?, supra note 6. Members of the EU will
implement the scheme, even if they have not participated. Id. The following coun-
tries are not WTO Members or KP Participants but are diamond producing or trad-
ing countries: Armenia, Andorra, Bermuda, Belarus, British Virgin Islands, Iran,
Lebanon, Monaco, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Id.
28. Supporting this concern, Congress' investigative branch, the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO), reported in February 2002 that the KP's universality re-
quirement posed a possible violation of Article XI of GATT. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-2-02-425T, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN
IN DETERRING TRADE IN CONFLICT DIAMONDS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING
AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
SENATE 12 n.13 (2002) (statement of Loren Yager, Director, Internal Affairs and
Trade), available at www.gao.gov; see also Fleshman, supra note 3.
29. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], was amended in 1994, and incorporated into
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act], in Annex 1A, which con-
sists of the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods. The Final Act and its an-
nexes form the basis of the "WTO Agreements." Final Act, supra.
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Article XI of GATT prohibits WTO Members from employ-
ing import or export bans or restrictions, "other than duties,
taxes or other charges," against the products of any other Mem-
ber.30 The KP's certification regime could constitute a trade re-
striction or a complete ban on the trade of rough diamonds with
non-participants, in violation of Article XI. It remains unsettled
whether the KP would be susceptible to a WTO challenge and
many believe this concern weakened the negotiation of a robust
and effective international certification regime.31
While possibly risking a WTO challenge, many KP Partici-
pants and NGOs have stressed that the universality require-
ment is essential if the certification scheme is to be effective.32
Given that the KP is intended to close the loopholes left by U.N.
sanctions, those supporting a tough stance on universality un-
derscore that allowing non-Participants to trade rough dia-
monds will seriously impede, if not completely sabotage, the ini-
• • 33
tiative. These supporters believe that the KP would fall within
either GATT's Article XX general exceptions, or the Article XXI
security exception.34
Part I of this article provides the backdrop behind the blood
diamond issue, focusing on the three African countries most af-
fected by wars to control diamond mines: Sierra Leone, Angola,
and the DRC. This section describes some of the political tur-
moil and rebel insurgencies that have created blood diamonds
30. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XI (1).
31. INGRID J. TAMM, DIAMONDS IN PEACE AND WAR: SEVERING THE CONFLICT
DIAMOND CONNECTION 2 (World Peace Found., Report No. 30, 2002). Tamm's work
is based in part on a conference held by the World Peace Foundation in October
2001, on the role of diamonds in prolonging conflicts in Africa. Id. The conference
was held at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Id. at
1.
32. See Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, Statement by Ambassador Si-
chan Siv, United States Representative on the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, on the Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict (Mar. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.UN.int/usa/02_035.htm (stating that "only the widest possible participa-
tion" will achieve the desired result of a "reduction of conflict and human suffering").
33. Conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting Gaborone para. 4, Kimberley Process
II Ministerial Statement (Nov. 29, 2001) (stating that the "widest possible participa-
tion in the certification scheme is essential and should be encouraged and facili-
tated").
34. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 18 n.24. Sens. Durbin,
DeWine, and Gregg, in a letter to President Bush, dated March 2002, stated that
pending U.S. legislation to regulate the diamond trade, infra Part III, "is in the na-
tional security interest of the U.S., [as well as] many other countries, and as such,
would fall under the national security exception of the WTO." Mark Weissenberger,
Senate Has Introduced New Conflict Diamond Legislation, NATVL JEWELER, May 1,
2002, at 7, available at 2002 WL 17600654.
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and have resulted in severe humanitarian crises. Part II exam-
ines both the criminalized and legitimate trade of diamonds. It
discusses the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed
at interdicting the trade of conflict diamonds and explains why
the traditional U.N. trade measures, sanctions, and embargoes
have proven inadequate to prevent the trafficking of conflict
diamonds. Within this framework, the development of the KP is
examined, as well as the international debate surrounding the
scheme's WTO compatibility. The certification scheme itself is
then explained. Part III examines U.S. efforts to implement po-
litically acceptable (and yet meaningful) legislation that is also
consistent with the KP and U.S. concerns regarding the
scheme's consistency with international trade obligations. Part
IV analyzes whether the KP is consistent with WTO obligations
under GATT Article XI, and whether the blocking measure fits
within the general exceptions of GATT Article XX or the secu-
rity exceptions of Article XXI. Part V analyzes the KP agree-
ment's strengths, weaknesses, and potential for success. This
article concludes that the KP's universality requirement does
not violate WTO obligations because the KP is not a unilateral
protectionist measure, but a multilateral, U.N.-endorsed initia-
tive that is necessary to ensure the safeguard of human life and
security. The certification scheme is an important first step to-
wards the elimination of diamonds as a source of conflict.
I. POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN AFRICA: CREATING
CONFLICT DIAMONDS
"Diamond wars are not a new phenomenon."35 Centuries
ago, when diamonds were found only in India, "powerful king-
doms fought for control of the mines that made them rich." 6
More recently, traders and smugglers of Sierra Leone's dia-
monds financed both sides of the Lebanese Civil War in the
1970s and 1980s.37 This "smuggling-for-financing" trend re-
ceived little attention. Also overlooked, in the early 1990s, was
the connection between diamonds and the Angolan conflict,
which was led by Jonas Savimbi, a major supplier of rough dia-
monds. 3s By the time Sierra Leone's diamond-war atrocities en-
35. Andrew Cockburn, Diamonds: The Real Story, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar.
2002, at 6, 22.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 23.
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tered the international consciousness, rebels had laundered at
least $10 billion in smuggled diamonds over the course of a dec-
ade. 9
It is now widely known that proceeds from the trade of dia-
monds are used to finance terrorist regimes and to overthrow
legitimate governments.4 ° Since the investigations into the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the dangers of
hidden smuggling networks have become more apparent.41 They
reach into the dark underworld of arms merchants and interna-
tional organized crime with ties to government officials and
even presidents.42 These corrupt networks corrode the political
economies of diamond-producing countries and raise serious
ethical issues for the industry, the consumer, and civil society.43
The politically stable countries of Australia, Botswana,
Canada, Namibia, Russia, and South Africa mine diamonds
peacefully and legitimately.44 Conflict diamonds, on the other
hand, originate primarily in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the
DRC,45 three countries that have suffered immeasurably from
armed conflict because they are rich with diamonds.46  In the
last decade, over six million people have been driven from theirhomes in these three countries. 47 While there are promises of
peace in Angola and Sierra Leone, the DRC is still besieged in
its struggle for peace and economic stability.
A. ANGOLA'S STRUGGLE WITH UNITA
The unexpected death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in Feb-
ruary 2002 finally paved the way for peace in Angola, at least
for the time being.45 Savimbi was considered the primary obsta-
39. 148 CONG. REC. S2014 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
40. Id.
41. See Karen DeYoung & Douglas Farah, Infighting Slows Hunt for Hidden Al
Qaeda Assets: Funds Put in Untraceable Commodities, WASH. POST, June 18, 2002,
at Al (explaining that investigators in the U.S. led effort to trace terrorists' assets
are developing a "growing understanding" that these assets are "not in banks but in
untraceable commodities" such as gold, diamonds, and tanzanite, and that the shift-
ing of assets from banks to precious gems and gold went largely unnoticed before
September 11th).
42. Nicholas Shaxon, supra note 24, at 215.
43. Id.
44. TAMM, supra note 31, at 5.
45. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 4.
46. See U.N. Doc. GA/9839, supra note 11.
47. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, H.R. 2722 PCS, 107th Cong. §2 (2001).
48. See generally Michael Dynes, Hope For Peace in Angola After Savimbi
[Vol. 12:1
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cle to peace, personifying the "corrupting influence of ambition,
mineral wealth, and the grinding brutality of war."49 With the
death of its guerrilla leader, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a peace pact with the
Government of Angola on April 4, 2002 and brought an end to
twenty-seven years of strife.5 ° The peace pact came after more
than ten years of U.N. efforts to restore peace to the region."'
Approximately one million Angolans died in the war and over
four million people, forty percent of the country's population,
have been displaced.52
In 1975, after fourteen years of war with Portugal, three
nationalist movements split control of the oil and diamond-rich
country. 3 The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA), and UNITA each had their share of control. 54  The
MPLA, which stood for "democratic socialism," successfully
seized power in 1975 and was backed by the Soviet Union.55 Al-
though the FNLA retreated, apartheid South Africa and the
United States backed UNITA, sustaining its bid for power.56
As a pawn of the Cold War between 1975 and 1989, the
country, including control of its natural resources, was divided
between the MPLA and UNITA. 57 MPLA forces profited from
Angola's oil reserves, while UNITA controlled most of the dia-
mond mines. 8 When the Cold War ended, outside funding from
the United States, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and Cuba
dissipated, making Angola's natural resources essential to fi-
Death Report, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 23, 2002, at 1. Savimbi was killed in a gun bat-
tle between the Angola government forces and rebel forces near the city of Luena,
Angola. Michael Dynes, Ceasefire Ends 27-year Civil War in Angola, TIMES
(LONDON), Apr. 5, 2002, at 21.
49. Editorial, Death of a Warlord, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 25, 2002, at 46.
50. Peace Pact Signed in Angola, CNN.COM, Apr. 4, 2002, at http://www
.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/04/04/angola.peace/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2002). See generally Press Release, U.N., Secretary-General's Special Adviser Briefs
Security Council on Angola: Says Recent Agreement Creates Brighter Prospects for
Lasting Peace, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4517th mtg., U.N. Doc SC/7372 (Apr. 23,
2002), available at http://www.UN.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7372.doc.htm.
51. Peace Pact Signed in Angola, supra note 50.
52. See id.
53. TAMM, supra note 31, at 8.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Dynes, supra note 48.
57. TAMM, supra note 31, at 8.
58. Id.
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nance the MPLA-UNITA conflict.59
After years of conflict, the MPLA and UNITA agreed to a
cease-fire in 1991, which resulted in a multiparty constitution. 60
In 1992, the U.N. monitored free elections.6 When Savimbi lost
the election to MPLA leader, Eduardo dos Santos, the war re-
ignited.62 Without external funding, Savimbi supplied his army
with "bombs and bullets by selling diamonds mined in areas he
controlled."63
The UNSC responded in September 1993 by imposing a
mandatory embargo on the sale or supply of weapons or petro-
leum products to UNITA forces.64 It also established a sanctions
committee to monitor and report on the implementation of the
mandatory measures. 65 When the Lusaka Protocol was executed
in late 1994, UNITA refused to comply with the peace accord.66
Three years later, it was still evident that tensions persisted
and extensive military preparations continued unabated.67  The
UNSC responded again with increased pressure on senior
UNITA leaders and their immediate families with mandatory
resolutions prohibiting their access to transportation or transit
through Members' territories."
As tensions further intensified, the UNSC declared that the
situation in Angola constituted a threat to international peace
and security in the region.69 In 1998, through UNSC Resolution
59. Id; see also Dynes, supra note 48.
60. Timeline: Angola- A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/country-profiles/1839740.stm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2002).
61. Id.
62. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanc-
tions Against UNITA, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/2000/203 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2000/2031. This
report is known as the "Fowler Report," after Ambassador Fowler of Canada. See
id.; see also Tony Dawe, Hopes Are High For End of Civil War, TIMES (LONDON),
Mar. 12, 2002, at 23.
63. Dawe, supra note 62, at 23.
64. See S.C. Res. 864, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3277th mtg., paras. 19-23, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/864 (1993).
65. Id.
66. See Lusaka Protocol, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1441
(1994); see also Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Ob-
server Mission in Angola (MONUA), U.N. Observer Mission in Angola, U.N. Doc.
S/1997/640 (1997) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/1997/640].
67. U.N. Doc. S/1997/640, supra note 66, at 3.
68. S.C. Res. 1127, U.N. SCOR, 3814th mtg., para. 4, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1127
(1997).
69. S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3891st rtg., para. 10, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1173 (1998).
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1173, diamonds were officially recognized as fuelling the Ango-
lan conflict.7° The resolution placed a mandatory embargo on all
UNITA-mined diamonds by prohibiting the direct or indirect
import from Angola of all diamonds not controlled through the
Government of Angola's certificate of origin regime.7 Although
this embargo reduced Savimbi's takings, the reduction was
marginal because smuggling diamonds is attractive and rela-
tively easy due to their high value and small size.72
With evidence that sanctions alone were insufficient, the
U.N. welcomed steps taken by the Government of Belgium in its
implementation of the UNITA diamond embargo. 73 Recognizing
that further effort was necessary to control the trade of conflict
diamonds, the U.N. additionally welcomed the proposal to de-
vise a system to control the trade of diamonds from their origin
to the bourses, or trading centers. 4
Since the U.N.'s endorsement of a trade-blocking measure
for conflict diamonds, significant progress has taken place in
Angola.75 Until April 2002, UNITA fought the legitimate gov-
ernment of Angola almost continually since the country gained
independence from Portugal in 1975.76 Peace finally appears to
be within reach.77 Still, Angola faces a battle for survival. Over
1.4 million people are in need of food aid, while 500,000 people
78
are in critical danger of starvation. Further, the country is
now heavily laden with approximately four to five million land
79
mines that cause death or injury to over 700 Angolans a year.
70. Id. para. 12(b).
71. Id.
72. Dawe, supra note 62; see also GOREUX, CONFLICT DIAMONDS para. 35
(World Bank Africa Region, Working Paper Series No. 13, 2001). For example, in
1999, the value of one kilogram of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone equaled that of
135 kilograms of gold, $1.15 million, or the total annual salary of 2000 Sierra Leon-
nean civil servants. Id.
73. S.C. Res. 1295, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4129th mtg., para. 17, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1295 (2000).
74. Id. para. 18.
75. See Peace Pact Signed in Angola, supra note 50.
76. Id.
77. Kofi Annan Visits Angola and Congratulates Its President On Peace Pro-
gress, ASS'D PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 26, 2002, available at WL ALLNEWSPLUS
(quoting U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan).
78. Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO/GIEWS: Africa Report No. 2, at 2, Aug.
2002, available at www.fao.orgfWAICENT/faoinfo/economicgiew/English/eaf/eaf02
08ell.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2002).
79. Kofi Annan Visits Angola And Congratulates Its President On Peace Pro-
gress, supra note 77.
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The implementation of a global rough diamond certification
scheme alone will not solve Angola's woes. The international
communities' rigorous commitment to the interdiction of the
conflict diamond trade cannot come soon enough, given Angola's
fragile political and security situation that for the first time of-
fers a glimmer of lasting peace.
B. THE RUF AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF SIERRA LEONE
While the war in Angola brought the issue of conflict dia-
monds to the attention of the U.N. and NGOs, Sierra Leone and
its now infamous war atrocities brought conflict diamonds to the
forefront of civil society.8° Control of the richest diamond mines
in the world ensnared Sierra Leone in the ravages of civil war
and human rights violations for more than a decade.81 The
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other rebel groups
fought viciously for control of the diamond fields.82 "The war be-
gan as a revolt against corruption, mixed up with a criminal
quest for illegally mined diamonds."83 The war ended with over
75,000 people dead."4 For over eight years, the RUF conscripted
an estimated 12,000 children from their families, forcing them
to fight as rebels.5 The RUF is internationally known for its vi-
cious abductions, rapes, and murders; however, the RUF is most
known for horrifically hacking-off the limbs of victims with ma-
chetes.~" Seeking to demonstrate that people without hands
could not vote against the RUF, over 20,000 people were muti-
lated . The gruesome tactics of the RUF strategically instigated
the mass exodus of the populace away from diamond-rich ar-
eas." By the end of the war, eighty percent of the country's na-
80. Cockburn, supra note 35, at 28.
81. See generally Paul Richards, War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 25 SUM
FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 41 (2001) (analyzing the corruption and politi-
cal instability in Sierra Leone from 1991 through 2000).
82. 148 CONG. REc. S2011 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
83. Sierra Leone's Flames of Peace, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
English/world/Africalnewsid_1767000/1767600.stm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
84. Ian Smillie, et al., The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Hu-
man Security, Partnership Africa Canada, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/
heartmatter.html.
85. 148 CONG. REC. S2014 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
86. Id.
87. GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS 213 (2002).
88. Id. at 72.
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tionals were refugees. 9
The war began in March 1991 when the RUF, led by former
army corporal Foday Sankoh, launched a campaign to overthrow
then-President Joseph Momoh.9" Sankoh's RUF soldiers claimed
to be fighting for justice and against the corruption of the
middleclass. 91 The people initially believed these claims and
viewed the RUF as a heroic army that would fight for a multi-
party government and equitable wealth distribution. Unfortu-
nately, however, control of the diamond mines was at the heart
of the conflict." The RUF took over the diamond-rich areas,
capturing the mines allegedly to hold as ransom in exchange for
a more democratic system, while killing and mutilating the local
villagers.94 Composed primarily of disenfranchised, uneducated
youths, the RUF was quickly revealed as a band of murderous
thugs.95
Sierra Leone's army initially fought to defend the govern-
ment with support from the Ceasefire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), the military arm of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).96 In 1992, however, the Sierra
Leonnean army, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, ousted
President Momoh and overthrew the government. 97 The RUF
continued its attacks.98
Finally in 1995, the U.N. intervened and appointed a Spe-
cial Envoy to negotiate a peace settlement.99 In January 1996,
Captain Strasser was ousted in a coup led by his own defense
minister, Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio."' A month later,
89. Id. at 31.
90. See Blood Diamonds (BBC Two television broadcast, Oct. 21, 2001), avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/audiovideo/programmes/correspondent/1604165
.stm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
91. Bringing Justice to Sierra Leone, BBC NEWS, Jan. 17, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/world/Africa/newsid1765000/1765611.stm (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2002).
92. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 71.
93. Bringing Justice to Sierra Leone, supra note 91.
94. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 71.
95. Id.
96. Id. at ix.
97. Richards, supra note 81, at 42.
98. Member States' Requests for Electoral Assistance to the United Nations Sys-
tem, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/websit13.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
99. See generally Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL Background, at http://www.un.org/
Depots/dpko/unamisil/UnamisilB.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
100. Timeline: Sierra Leone - A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/world/Africa/newsid-1065000/1065898.stm (last vis-
ited May 20, 2002).
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parliamentary and presidential elections were held with the as-
sistance of the U.N..' Although the RUF recognized the win-
ner, Dr. Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the conflict continued.02
The Special Envoy, Mr. Berhanu Dinka of Ethiopia, working
with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS,
was able to bring about a peace settlement in 1996, known as
the Abidjan Accord."' One year later, however, the army and
the RUF joined forces to become a ruling "junta" and overthrew
the peace accord in a coup d'6tat, forcing President Kabbah into
exile in Guinea.'04
In late 1997, the UNSC imposed sanctions against Sierra
Leone, including an embargo on weapons and petroleum,0 5 al-
though logistical support and rifles were provided to President
Kabbah's allies. With assistance from ECOMOG to drive out
the RUF, President Kabbah was able to return to Freetown, but
his foothold on peace was brief.1 6 The RUF again seized parts of
Freetown and the city was once more immersed in war.1
0 7
A cease-fire in May 1999 led to another peace agreement
signed by the RUF, the Sierra Leone government, and the U.N.
in July (the Lomd Agreement).0 8 After six weeks of negotiations
in Lom6, the capital of Togo, Western negotiators seeking a
speedy resolution to the insurgency promised the rebels gov-
ernment positions and immunity from prosecution for war
crimes.'09 Some criticized the agreement as too favorable to the
RUF and "[m]eanwhile peace deal or not, the diamond channels
were wide open.""0
Although U.N. troops were installed to enforce the peace ac-
cord, the agreement failed."' In an effort to protect Freetown,
maintain security, and train Sierra Leone's army, U.N. peace-
keepers were increased to approximately 13,000 and were aug-
101. Id.
102. See Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL Background, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 80-82.
105. S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822nd mtg., para. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1132 (1997).
106. See CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 84-86.
107. See id. at 86-89.
108. See CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 90; see also Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL
Background, supra note 99.
109. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 90-91.
110. Id. at 91.
111. See id. at 91-95 (describing the failure of the UNAMSIL peacekeeping ef-
forts).
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mented by another 750 from the United Kingdom's military."
2
In May 2000, approximately six months after the Lom6 Agree-
ment was established, ECOMOG troops were attacked and the
RUF took more than 500 U.N. troops as hostages."3  British
forces worked to release and rescue the hostages between May
and September 2000."'
As a result of rebel piracy, Sierra Leone's official diamond
exports nearly vanished. 1 5 The 9,000 carats officially exported
in 1999 reveal the shocking extent of the plunder when com-
pared to the two million carats exported annually in the
1960s.1 6 In its struggle to break the link between armed conflict
and diamonds, the U.N. established tough sanctions against Li-
beria, based upon "unequivocal and overwhelming" evidence
that the Government of Liberia was supporting the RUF at all
levels, as well as other rebel groups in the region." 7 Like the
UNSC's 1998 resolution placing an embargo on UNITA dia-
monds from Angola, UNSC Resolution 1343 in March 2001,
banned the importation of all rough diamonds exported from Li-
beria, whether or not originating from Liberia."" The resolution
further established an arms and petroleum embargo and prohib-
ited Member States from providing travel access to senior Gov-
ernment of Liberia officials and their families." 9
112. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SIERRA LEONE, at http://www.odci.
gov/cialpublications/factbooklgeos/sl.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
113. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 93.
114. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Expresses Full Sup-
port For Rescue of U.N. Peacekeepers in Kailahun, Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th
Sess., 4173rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2000/24 (2002).
115. CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 23.
116. Id.
117. S.C. Res. 1343, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4287th mtg., para. B2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1343 (2001).
118. Id. para. 6.
119. Id. para. 7(a). The UNSC has additionally linked Liberia's President
Charles Taylor to the illegal-timber trade. Although Taylor has profited tremen-
dously from the conflict diamond trade, the greater part of his wealth has been
gained through control of Liberia's timber industry. See Carla Hoyos, Liberian tim-
ber in U.N. Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2001, available at
http://forests.org/archive/Africa/litiunsp.htm. President Taylor gave the Indonesian-
owned company, Oriental Timber Corporation (OTC), a 1.44 million hectare conces-
sion and a monopoly over Liberia's transportation. Id. This maneuver has enabled
OTC to import weapons into Liberia and transport them to Sierra Leone on logging
roads. See Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Calls on U.N. Security
Council to Embargo Liberian 'Logs of War' (Jan. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/press/pr_200101171iberia.html. Moreover,
the OTC has been linked to illegal logging and to smuggling arms to RUF rebels in
Sierra Leone. See Press Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Exposes Scandal of Afri-
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While insecurity has continued, U.N. troops are finally able
to patrol peacefully certain areas in Sierra Leone previously
controlled by rebels.120 Throughout 2001, rebels gradually dis-S121
armed.. In January 2002, the U.N. announced the completion
of the disarmament of over 45,000 rebel soldiers. 122 The U.N. es-
tablished war crimes tribunals in Freeport to try Foday Sankoh,
who has been held by the U.N. since 2000, along with dozens of
other rebel fighters.
123
Although the country has been left in ruins with crude
graves and roadsides littered with bones,2 4 there is hope that
the country will continue to stabilize. President Kabbah was re-
elected in May 2002 by a seventy percent vote in general elec-
tions conducted with U.N. assistance, in what was the country's
first peaceful election since the country gained independence
122
over forty years ago.
C. THE DRC & AFRICA'S WORLD WAR
While Angola and Sierra Leone have made tremendous
strides toward lasting peace, the DRC has been embattled in a
complex conflict involving seven African nations, which is con-
sidered to be Africa's First World War. 126 This protracted battle,
waged over natural resources ranging from diamonds to timber,
killed an estimated 2.5 million people in the last four years
alone. 127
The DRC's natural resources may be the most opulent on
can Rainforest Destruction and Demands Governments to Act Now (Nov. 14, 2001),
available at http://forests.org/archive/Africa/grexscan.htm.
120. Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., para. 2., U.N. Doc. S/2002/987 (2002).
121. Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1195 (2001).
122. See CAMPBELL, supra note 87, at 215.
123. Id. at 216.
124. Id. at 214.
125. Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics As Usual? (Int'l Crisis Group, Free-
town/Brussels IGC Africa Report No. 49), July 12, 2002, at 4, available at
www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/westafrica/reports/A400698-15072002.pdf; see also
Sierra Leone: Ahmed Tejan Kabbah Re-elected President in U.N. Assisted Vote, U.N.
NEWS SERVICE, at http://www.un.org/esa/africa/UNNewsOnAfrica/kabahreelected_
pres-sierraleone.htm (last modified May 20, 2002).
126. See DR Congo War: Who is Involved and Why, BBC NEWS, at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/l136470.stm (last modified Jan. 25, 2001).
127. See 148 CONG. REC. E909 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tony
Hall); see also Congo Pays the Price for War, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/hi/English/world/Africa/newsid_1564000/1564653.stm (last modified Sept. 26,
2001).
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earth. The DRC is rich in diamonds, cobalt, copper, timber, and
"coltan," a metallic ore essential to the production of electronics
capacitors. 28 In 2001, in stark contrast to the country's wealth
of natural resources, a reported sixteen million people were
starving, while two of five children died in infancy. 9
After sixty years of brutal Belgian colonialism, 3 ° the Congo
became an independent nation in 1960.1" Five turbulent years
128. Congo Pays the Price for War, supra note 127. "Coltan" is short for Colum-
bite-tantalite, a metallic ore, which when refined becomes metallic tantalum.
Eighty percent of the world's coltan deposits are located in eastern DRC. Little
known to the average U.S. citizen, coltan is the primary ingredient in the capacitors
used in electronic equipment such as cell phones, DVDs, and computers. See British
Columbia Institute of Technology, BCIT Chemistry Resource Center, at
http://nobel.scas.bcit.ca/resource/ptable/ta.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2002). Coltan
is essential to the manufacture of night vision goggles, camera lenses, fiber optics,
CB radios, smoke detectors, nuclear reactors, and airbags. Id. It is also used in sur-
gical equipment for bone repair, internal stitching to connect torn nerves, and woven
gauze to bind abdominal muscles. Id. Coltan is so vital to the electronics industry
that in December 2000, it was the cause of a Christmas shopping "crisis," when
PlayStation 2 platforms were scarce due to the short supply of coltan. Kark Vick,
Vital Ore Funds Congo's War, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2001, at Al; see also Dena Mon-
tague and Frida Berrigan, The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
DOLLARS & SENSE MAG., July/Aug. 2001, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler
.com/Africa/BusinessWar Congo.html. The proceeds from the sale of coltan are fu-
eling the forces of neighboring Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. It is estimated that
the Rwandan army made at least $250 million over a period of eighteen months
through the sale of coltan, even though no coltan is mined in Rwanda. Imtiyaz
Delawala, What is Coltan - The Link Between Your Cell Phone and Congo,
ABCNEWS.COM, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/nightline/DailyNews/coltan-explai
ner.html (last modified Jan. 31, 2002).
Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA-4) introduced House Bill 2954 in Sep-
tember 2001, a bill intended "to prohibit the importation into the United States of
colombo tantalite from certain countries involved in the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and for other purposes." H.R. 2954, 107th Cong. (2001). The
bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Trade, and no further action was
taken. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, H.R. 2954, at http:/Thomas.
loc.gov/bss/dl07query.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
129. Congo In Dire Trouble, Say Agencies, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/hi/EnglishworldAfrica/newsid_1477000/1477003.stm (last modified Aug. 7,
2001).
130. As many as ten million Congolese people died between 1891 and 1911 as a
result of murder, starvation, exhaustion, and disease. During this time, King Leo-
pold required, by law, the supply of labor, rubber from the vast rubber tree forests,
and ivory to Belgian agents. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 22. "The spoils of
plunder constituted huge capital flows into Belgium." Id. at 24. King Leopold ob-
tained the riches of the Congo using slave labor and by committing murder, mutila-
tion, rape, and torture. Id. at 23.
131. See Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWS, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/Englishlworld/Africa/newsid_1072000/1072684.stm (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2002); Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWS, at
http://news.bbc.co.uld2/hi/world/Africa/country-profiles/1076399.stm (last modified
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later, Joseph Mobutu became President after a coup d'6tat. 133
He ran the country as a military dictatorship and renamed the
country "Zaire" in 1971.134 Failed foreign investments, cancelled
development programs, and riots by unpaid soldiers character-
ized his thirty-year reign.13' His presidency finally ended over a
period between 1996 and 1997, after a ruthless conflict between
rebels and Mobutu's government soldiers.
3 6
The U.N. issued a five-point peace plan in February 1997,
which called for: (1) the immediate cessation of hostilities; (2)
the withdrawal of all external forces; (3) the reaffirmation of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire and other states in
the Great Lakes region; (4) the protection of all refugees and
displaced persons; and (5) the rapid and peaceful settlement of
the conflict through dialogue, the electoral process, and an in-
ternational conference on peace in the region. " 7 In spite of the
peace plan, the rebels captured eastern Zaire, and then the capi-
tal city, Kinshasa.138 Kabila declared himself President two
months later and renamed "Zaire" the "Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
Instability continued under the new president. 4 ° A new re-
bellion turned into a civil war between rival factions of Rwan-
June 29, 2002) (providing a summary of the DRC's history, politics and economic
background).
132. A mutiny of armed forces began in 1960 and ended five years later with a
military coup that involved the assassination of the country's Prime Minister,
Patrice Lumumba. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 95-96.
133. Justin Pearce, DR Congo's Troubled History, BBC NEWS, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi//world/Africa/1120825.stm (last modified Jan. 16, 2001).
134. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 141.
135. See id. at 149 ("From 1975 until its demise in 1997, the Mobutu regime pre-
sided over an economic crisis that reduced a once proud people to abject poverty and
a daily quest for sheer survival."). During Mobutu's reign, he received strong exter-
nal support from the United States, France, and Belgium, as well as support from
regional allies such as apartheid South Africa, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Mo-
rocco. Id. at 160. This support was arguably predicated upon three premises: (1)
that a multi-ethnic Congo needed a "strongman" to maintain stability, prevent chaos
and subvert communism; (2) the moral commitment, within the context of the Cold
War, to support allies, in spite of their treatment of their own citizens; and (3) the
need to promote Western interests in Central and Southern Africa. Id. at 160-61.
136. Id. at 276; see also Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 131.
137. S.C. Res. 1097, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3741st mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1097 (1997).
138. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 276.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 237 ("A regime of pillage was established, with Ugandans and Rwan-
dans dividing up among themselves the gold, diamonds, timber, coffee, and
tea.. .Entire factories.. .machinery and tools have also been plundered.").
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dan and Ugandan-backed soldiers in 1998.' As Angola, Na-
mibia, and Zimbabwe supported Kabila, the entire country be-
came a battleground. 142 The U.N. called for an immediate cease-
fire in April 1999.143 The DRC, Zambia, Angola, Namibia,
Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe finally signed the Ceasefire
Agreement in Lusaka in July 1999, agreeing to cease hostilities
and withdraw rebel forces in the DRC. 44
Shortly thereafter, the Congolese rebel groups, the Move-
ment for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese
Rally for Democracy (RCD), agreed to adhere to the cease-fire. 14 5
Over the next year, the U.N. expanded its mission in the DRC to
5,500 military personal to monitor compliance with the cease-
fire, remove mines from the area, and provide humanitarian as-
sistance.4 6 Despite the cease-fire and the U.N. mission's efforts,
peace was illusive. In December 2000, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil expressed their "serious concern" over the humanitarian cri-
sis resulting from the conflict and again called for the immedi-
ate withdrawal of all Rwandan and Ugandan forces.
47
In early 2001, Joseph Kabila was inaugurated as president
only days after his father's assassination. President Joseph
Kabila continues to face substantial opposition among numerous
factions, making the solution to the DRC's intractable conflict
141. Sierra Leone: Ahmed Tejan Kabbah Re-elected President in U.N. Assisted
Vote, supra note 125. But see NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 227-28 (explain-
ing the politics behind the plot to oust Kabila and arguing that the conflict was not
actually a "civil war," but a clever ploy by Rwanda and Uganda, as well as Burundi,
to benefit from the disintegration of the Congolese state by toppling Kabila and in-
stalling a new puppet figurehead).
142. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 238.
143. S.C. Res. 1234, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3993d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1234 (1999).
144. Id.
145. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 4, at 241 (explaining that the Congo-
lese rebels had been fighting the war on two fronts, "with a double strategy of resis-
tance against external aggression and new forms of dictatorship by the Kabila re-
gime."). See generally U.N. Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC), at www.monuc.orgleng/onmonuc/background/EN background.asp (last
visited Sept. 20, 2002).
146. S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4104th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1291 (2000).
147. S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4247th mtg., para. 10, at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1332, (2000); see also U.N. Security Council "Concerned" By Resumption
of Fighting in DR Congo, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 23, 2000, available at 2000
WL 24785686.
148. Sierra Leone: Ahmed Tejan Kabbah Re-elected President in U.N. Assisted
Vote, supra note 125.
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difficult to unravel. 4' The Angola, Uganda, and Zimbabwe con-
tingents are partially withdrawn." 0 As of May 2002, the U.N.
had verified that only Namibia had withdrawn all of its combat
troops from the DRC."'
The U.N. and South Africa brokered a peace agreement be-
tween the DRC and Rwanda in July 2002.152 The DRC promised
to disarm and arrest thousands of Hutu rebels, while Rwanda
agreed to withdraw tens of thousands of Rwandan troops."3
Justifiably, the agreement has been met with a wary hope for
peace."' Less than three weeks after the agreement was signed,
the U.N. dispatched humanitarian aid to the eastern part of the
DRC, where approximately one hundred people were killed as a
result of ethnic conflict in the town of Bunia."5
A U.N. Panel of Experts issued a report on the illegal ex-
ploitation of the DRC's natural resources in April 2001,156 which
recommended, among other things, sanctions against countries
involved in illegal activities in the DRC and the "improvement
of international mechanisms and regulations governing some
natural resources." 7 The panel also recommended an immedi-
ate, temporary embargo on the import or export of coltan, tim-
ber, gold, and diamonds from or to Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda and sanctions against any country breaking this em-
bargo.15s The U.N. has not approved any resolutions to date im-
plementing the recommendations of the Panel of Experts."'
149. 148 CONG. REC. E909, (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Hall)
(stating that the DRC's war is complex because it has involved several nations and
several rebel groups which have been fighting for political control to avail them-
selves of at least nine different valuable natural resources).
150. Report of the Security Council Mission to the Great Lakes Regions, 27 April-
7 May 2002, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 3406th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2002/537 (2002).
151. Id.
152. See African "World War Peace Signing," CNN.CoM, at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/world/africa/07/30/congo.deal/index.html (last modified July 30, 2002).
153. See Congo and Rwanda Sign Peace Deal, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/low/Africa/2160522.stm (last modified July 30, 2002).
154. See African "World War Peace Signing," supra note 152.
155. U.N. Dispatches Relief Flight to Scene of Recent Fighting in DR of Congo,
U.N. NEWS SERVICE, at http://wwwO.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=4489 (last
modified Aug. 16, 2002).
156. See Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Re-
sources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2001/357 (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2001/357].
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id. at 42.
159. See 148 CONG. REC. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tony
Hall). Congressman Tony Hall introduced a resolution in the House of Representa-
tives, H.R. 410, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002), on May 23, 2002, calling for President
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In October 2002, the panel reported that, although the
seven-nation war has diminished in intensity, "the overlapping
microconflicts that it provoked continue."160  Criminal groups
linked to the armies of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and the
Government of the DRC have established a self-financing war
economy and continue to benefit from microconflicts over miner-
als and other resources.16' They will not voluntarily disband,
even as foreign troops withdraw. 162 The panel further recom-
mended that all Member States that trade rough diamonds join
the KP, and noted that without universal participation, the KP
would be a less effective instrument.
163
D. ENDING CONFLICT THROUGH ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS
Angola, Sierra Leone, and the DRC ought to be some of the
wealthiest nations in the world. 64 Their natural resources are
tremendous,' 6' and yet they are failed states, suerng
Bush "to press for a United Nations embargo on Congolese diamonds." 148 CONG.
REC. E908. Congressmen Hall stated that because the KP has limited the definition
of conflict diamonds to those diamonds that are embargoed by the U.N., without a
U.N. embargo against Congolese diamonds, these diamonds are not technically con-
flict diamonds as defined by the KP. Id. Congressman Hall further stated that
President Bush's trade and diplomatic representatives had assured that if Congress
would use the KP's definition of conflict diamonds, the Administration would prom-
ise to press the UNSC to extend its embargo to other conflict zones, including the
DRC. 148 CONG. REC. E910 (May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tony Hall).
160. See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natu-
ral Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (2002), para. 12 [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. S/2002/1146].
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. 148 CONG. REC. E908 (statement of Rep. Tony Hall).
165. WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21' CENTuRY? 213 (2000), available
at www.worldbank.org/publications. For example, Sierra Leone is rich not only in
gem-quality diamonds, but also in oil, rubies, gold, rutile, and bauxite. CAMPBELL,
supra note 87, at xxii. Sierra Leone "should be the Saudi Arabia of Africa, but it's
not." Id.
166. "Failed" or "failing" states are those "which are torn by violent conflict to an
extent that people's every day life is affected" where "the government is either un-
able to cope with inter-group conflict or, most likely, it is part of this conflict." Lo-
thar Brock, Enforcement and Intervention vis & vis Failing States: Pro and Contra,
Conference, Failed States III: Globalization and the Failed State, Apr. 7-10, 2000,
Florence, Italy, available at http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed-states/2000/papers/
brock.html. This conference was sponsored by a grant from the Strategic Outreach
Program of the U.S. Army War College and the Office of International Programs at
Purdue University. Id. "[Sitate failure ... manifests itself in an inability of the
government to exert control." Id. Failed states in the 21st Century are character-
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obstinate state of humanitarian crises. Their economies are not
diversified.' Instead, primary commodity exports are their
biggest industries. The people are impoverished and economic
growth is insufferably slow.
69
The Director of the Development Research Group for the
World Bank, Paul Collier, has posited that three key economic
conditions are closely linked to the type of civil rebellion seen in
ized by blurred lines "between government repression and organized crime," which
are "carried out with the help of political, social and economic networks which may
span the world." Id. Though Sierra Leone is in the process of rebuilding, ten years of
civil war left nearly half the country's inhabitants homeless, with a collapse of the
country's productive agriculture and mining sectors, and its most basic social ser-
vices for water, health, and education. Press Release, World Bank, Sierra Leone
Disarmament Program and Donor Conference (June 5, 2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/sl-pr-factsheet.pdf. Without basic social services, An-
gola's thirteen million people have an average life expectancy of forty-five years.
Declan Walsh, Billions of Dollars Simply Vanish; Angolan Government Accused of
'State Robbery,' THE HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Aug. 24, 2002, at D8, available at 2002
WL 24455728. Unemployment is eighty percent and thirty percent of children die
before the age of five. Id. The country ranked at the very bottom of the U.N.'s Hu-
man Development Index for 2000, with infant, child, and maternal mortality rates
the highest in the world and among the lowest in life expectancy. Id. Conflict has
left the DRC with failing public utilities and a collapsed infrastructure; roads, wa-
terways, and railroads are almost unusable. Press Release, World Bank, Donors
Meet New DR Congo Government to Organize Emergency Aid (July 3, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/news/pr.pdf.
167. Nearly seventy-five percent of the DRC's economy is composed of either ag-
riculture (in particular, cash crops such as tea, coffee, palm oil, and rubber) or min-
ing. See U.S. STATE DEP'T, BACKGROUND NOTES: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO,
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). In 1997, for
example, more than fifty percent of the DRC's total annual exports were diamonds.
See id. Copper, coffee, cobalt, and crude oil account for the remaining exports. CIA,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, at www.odci.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/sl.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). Crude oil constitutes
ninety percent of Angola's exports. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, ANGOLA, at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
While Sierra Leone's exports consist of diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee and fish. CIA,
WORLD FACTBOOK: SIERRA LEONE, supra note 112. In a country where sixty-eight
percent of the people live below the poverty line, nearly two-thirds of Sierra Leone's
labor force engages in subsistence agriculture. Id.
168. Eighty-five percent of Angola's population survives primarily from subsis-
tence agriculture. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, ANGOLA, supra note 112. The 4.9
percent economic growth rate is overshadowed by a 325 percent inflation rate. Id.
Similarly, the DRC's fifteen percent growth rate in 2000 pales in comparison to its
540 percent inflation rate. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO, supra note 167. A certain degree of economic progress can be seen in
Sierra Leone. It had a 4.2 percent estimated growth rate in 2000, while its inflation
rate was estimated at about fifteen percent. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, SIERRA
LEONE, supra note 112.
169. See supra note 166 for a brief discussion of the impact of poverty in Angola,
Sierra Leone, and the DRC.
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Africa: (1) dependence on primary commodity exports; (2) low
average income of the country, and (3) slow economic growth. 7 °
Collier suggests that such economies, which are intrinsically
dependent on highly lootable primary commodity exports, such
as diamonds, provide significant opportunity for "predatory re-
bellion"171 or the "looting" of economic resources.'72 He explains
that it is still profitable to exploit these resources despite rebel
looting because primary commodities are established and long
lasting.
7 3
He further explains that these lootable commodities must
be transported and exported and that rebel forces are guaran-
teed to confront government authorities at some point en route,
which will lead to the natural growth of rebel armies in both
size and power.174 The growth of these armies results from the
fact that approximately ten percent of the labor forces in these
diamond-rich African countries are artisanal miners and dia-
mond diggers clinging to the hope of striking it rich. 175 With the
lack of better employment, most of these diggers remain in pov-
erty at the diamond mines and constitute an easy target for re-
bel recruitment. 7 1 Once these diggers are recruited, they either
join as fighting rebels or continue to dig for diamonds to finance
the war.177 A World Bank report indicates that natural resource
dependence will begin to decline once a civil war ends and a
country stabilizes and sustains economic policy reforms for five
years. Within ten years of reform implementation, this depend-
ence will be notably reduced. 17 Collier suggests that if it were
more difficult for rebels to sell their looted commodities, the
170. PAUL COLLIER, WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CIVIL CONFLICT AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 9-11 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank
.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.pdf.
171. Collier explains that the pilfering of accessible local commodities funds re-
bellion. Id. at 9. "Rebel groups need to meet the payroll without producing anything,
so they prey on an economic activity that won't collapse under the weight of their
predatory activities." Press Release, World Bank Group, Greed For Diamonds and
Other "Lootable" Commodities Fuels Civil Wars: New Report Challenges Popular
Notions About Origins of Civil Conflict, News Release No. 2000/419/S (June 15,
2000) (quoting Collier), at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/news/pressrelease.nsf.
172. COLLIER, supra note 170, at 3, 9.
173. Id. at 9-10. Primary commodities include such things as diamonds and
other mineral resources, old growth forests, and coffee trees. Id.
174. Id. at 10.
175. GOREUX, supra note 72, para. 18.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. COLLIER, supra note 170, at 16.
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value of the goods, i.e. diamonds, would decrease. 179 Predatory
rebellion would decline because it would be less lucrative.' 80
With U.N. assistance and the concerted cooperation of the
international community, sound policy reforms such as the KP
will enable these countries to regain control of their natural
wealth, which will foster political stability, economic diversity,
and growth. Since the rebel disarmament and restoration of
control of the diamond mines to the government of Sierra Leone,
the country's gross domestic product increased by 5.4 percent
and inflation decreased sharply to three percent.'8 ' Due to these
economic, financial, and security improvements, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) has agreed to make twelve million
dollars in low-interest loans available to Sierra Leone. 82
A global certification scheme is not likely to be a panacea
for resolving all of Africa's political and economic difficulties.
However, it will likely decrease the value of looted diamonds.
This devaluation will enable the legitimate governments of
these countries to implement further necessary changes. For
example, deep mine shafts and formal mines are easier to over-
see than surficial alluvial deposits 83 and they would facilitate
the governmental control that is necessary to eliminate rebel
looting.8 4  Such improved formal mines require a capital in-
vestment and technology that these war-torn countries cannot
afford.' 5 Moreover, without minimal political stability, these
countries have little chance of obtaining the necessary tax reve-
nues or investment funds required for such projects. As noted
by the WTO's former Director-General, "[clertainly no lasting
peace has ever been built on the shaky foundations of economic
insecurity, inequality and isolation."'86
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. IMF Unblocks Aid for Sierra Leone, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc
.uk/hi/English/world/Africa/newsid_1870000/1870259.stm (last modified Mar. 13,
2002).
182. Id.
183. Diamonds originate in two geological formations: kimberlite pipes and allu-
vial deposits. Kimberlite diamonds require deep mining, while alluvial deposits can
be found at or near the surface of the ground, including washed out in rivers. See
Diamond Geology, available at http://www.debeersgroup.com/exploration/expGeol-
ogy.asp (providing an overview of the geology of diamonds, including an explanation
of differences between kimberlite and alluvial deposits).
184. Smuggling is Easy: The Boom in "Conflict Diamonds," ECONOMIST, Mar. 16,
2001, at 50.
185. Id.
186. Renato Ruggiero, Former Director-General of the WTO, Speech at the
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II. THE CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE, LEGITIMATE
INDUSTRY, AND THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
A. TRACING THE WORLD'S MOST CONCENTRATED FORM OF
WEALTH
Conflict diamonds originate primarily in Angola, Sierra
Leone, and the DRC. However, they are often smuggled
through adjacent countries, including Liberia, the Central Afri-
can Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and
Gambia.1 8 7 Additionally, the U.N. reported that the individuals
involved in the trade of conflict diamonds come from all over the
world.18 Often referred to as the world's most concentrated
form of wealth, diamonds can be used as currency to purchase
weapons, fund drug deals, launder money, or finance other
crimes.8 9 Rebels and terrorists alike use diamonds as a means
of hording wealth, which allows the international movement of
resources without resorting to normal banking channels where
assets are more easily detected and subject to seizure. 90 Con-
flict diamonds are attractive to those interested in avoiding
banking institutions because diamonds are a convertible form of
wealth and are subject to fewer trading restrictions, unlike
other commodities or illegal substances.' 9'
The blood diamond trade is generally estimated to be worth
approximately $300 million a year, making up between three
and fifteen percent of the global diamond industry.' 92 This rela-
tively low percentage within the global market skews the real
impact of conflict diamonds within the key countries affected by
intractable civil strife.'93 Moreover, these estimates represent
only the ascertainable percentage of trade in conflict diamonds;
the actual percentage may be even greater.
194
MENA III Conference, Cairo (Nov. 12, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/
English/news-e/pres96_e/prO58_e.htm.
187. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 4-5; Smuggling is Easy,
supra note 184.
188. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 4-5.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id.; Farah, supra note 13.
191. Farah, supra note 13.
192. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 6.
193. Paul Harris & Jason Burke, Mugabe Men's Blood Gems: Businessman Says
General and Ministers Make Fat Profits from Smuggled Diamonds, OBSERVER, Mar.
3, 2002, available at http://observer.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,660963,00.ht
ml.
194. Smillie, supra note 84, § 1.2 (estimating that African rebel groups may
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On the floor of the House of Representatives in May 2002,
Congressman Tony Hall stated that as much as eighty-five per-
cent of Congolese diamonds are smuggled out of the country, si-
phoning approximately $854 million a year from the country's
gross domestic product.9 Many of these diamonds are "illicit"
diamonds, as opposed to "conflict" diamonds, smuggled by indi-
vidual traders and farmers with small-scale enterprises.196 The
actual dollar amount attributed to looters versus rebels, how-
ever, is difficult to determine given the informal trading chan-
nels in both cases.'97 Either way, forty million dollars in taxes
are unpaid annually, leaving the DRC's people without bene-
fit.
198
Because they change hands multiple times as they are
traded from country to country, the true origin of diamonds is
obscured. They often enter the stream of commerce through
smuggling and other illegal behavior that may conceal their ac-
tual origin. 199 Experienced diamond traders can determine the
origin of uncut stones, but once rough diamonds are polished, it
is virtually impossible to determine their true source.'00 There-
after, blood gems are irretrievably mixed with legitimate dia-
monds in the stream of commerce.' °'
Peace and the protection of the legal diamond trade are vi-
tal to the social and economic welfare of these diamond-rich but
supply as much as twenty percent of the world's global diamond market).
195. 148 CONG. REC. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (Statement of Rep. Tony
Hall).
196. JANET MACGAFFEY & RIMY BAZENGUISSA-GANGA, CONGO-PARIS:
TRANSNATIONAL TRADERS ON THE MARGINS OF THE LAW 33 (2000).
197. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 7 (stating that the
criminal nature of the illicit diamond trade, including conflict diamonds, "precludes
determination of the actual extent of the problem").
198. 148 CONG. REC. E908 (statement of Rep. Tony Hall).
199. U.N. Doc. S/2000/203, supra note 62; see also Conflict Diamonds: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. 46 (2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearing].
200. Smuggling is Easy, supra note 184. Experts can generally identify the
source of rough diamonds according to the surficial characteristics, crystal qualities,
and other structure-related characteristics. NICHOLAS COOK, CONG. RES. SERV. RPT.,
DIAMONDS AND CONFLICT: POLICY PROPOSALS AND BACKGROUND 12 (2001). These
methods, however, are more of an art than a science. Once a rough diamond is cut
and polished, the surface characteristics and trace elements are removed, making a
determination of origin more tenuous. Id. At present, geo-chemical and automated
physical characteristic methods are being researched for identifying diamond origin
(and individual diamonds), using geo-chemical testing methods for trace elements
and impurities, employing plasma mass spectrometry, and similar technologies. Id.
at 16 n.36.
201. Smuggling is Easy, supra note 184.
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impoverished and politically fragile African countries.0 2 Despite
U.N. peacekeeping efforts and improved enforcement regimes,
U.N. statistics substantiate that mandatory sanctions against
the trade of diamonds from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola
have failed to prevent the financing of armed conflict in Africa.
0 3
The U.N. monitoring mechanism, which was established to
gather information and investigate UNITA20 4 sanctions viola-
tions in Angola, reported that UNITA was able to exchange dia-
monds for cash and weapons. 0 5 Diamonds also enabled UNITA
to acquire external support and to stockpile wealth in the form
of diamond caches, rather than bank accounts.2 6 In 2000, one
million dollars in diamonds was smuggled from Angola each
day, constituting $350 to $420 million annually. 27  This
represented approximately half of Angola's total annual
production. 208 Although UNITA is credited with smuggling at
least twenty-five percent of this total amount, the rest is attrib-
uted to smuggling enterprises. These illicit diamonds accounted
for about five percent of the worldwide rough diamond sales for
2000.209
The diamonds in these countries are scattered over vast ter-
ritories making it difficult for governments to control the dia-
mond mines.210 With respect to Angola, the monitoring mecha-
nism reported that, despite U.N. sanctions, not a single parcel of
illicit diamonds had been intercepted worldwide.211 "These dia-
monds seem to vanish into thin air" after leaving their country
of origin.212 Furthermore, U.N. world importing data suggest
202. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/56/502, supra note 8.
203. Fleshman, supra note 3, at 15.
204. See supra Part I.A., for a discussion of the tensions between UNITA and
rival Angolan groups.
205. A Panel of Experts, established pursuant to U.N. Res. 1237 (1999), issued a
report on sanctions against UNITA, entitled Final Report of the Panel of Experts on
Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, U.N. Doc. S/2000/203, su-
pra note 62. As a result of the Panel's findings, the UNSC adopted resolution 1295
of 18 April 2000, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1295 (2000), which requested the Secretary-
General to establish a monitoring mechanism to investigate violations of the meas-
ure contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), and 1173 (1998). Id.
206. U.N. Doc. S/2000/203, supra note 62.
207. Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against
UNITA, U.N. SCOR 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2001/966, para. 141 (2001) [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. S/20011966].
208. Id.
209. Id.; see also Fleshman, supra note 3, at 15.
210. See, e.g., TAMM, supra note 31, at 8.
211. Id., supra note 31, at 9 (citing U.N. Doc. S/20011966, supra note 207).
212. Fleshman, supra note 3, at 15.
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that many countries' exports of rough diamonds far exceed their
213production. For instance, although the United Arab Emirates
globally exported $177 million in rough diamonds in 2000, it
neither mines rough diamonds, nor reported importing any
rough diamonds from producing countries."' Between 1998 and
2000, Liberia exported $300 million in diamonds, despite having
relatively few diamond mines."' The same year, Sierra Leone's
exports were correspondingly reduced by fifty percent to $30
million.216 Similarly, the Central African Republic (CAR) offi-
cially exported 400,000 carats in 2000, but Belgium alone im-
ported 900,000 carats from CAR.21 7 The CAR minister of mines
described the discrepancy as the "annual inevitability" of dia-
mond laundering.18 Since the imposition of the U.N. diamond
embargo, an increasing number of diamonds are smuggled
through CAR, where the number of diamond-buying bureaus re-
cently tripled. 19
In April 2002, the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions
against UNITA reiterated an earlier determination that import-
ing countries and trading centers are unable "to intervene effec-
tively in the trade to prevent embargoed diamonds [from] reach-
ing markets."22 ° It also noted that there were "acute problems of
collecting evidence of violations of the sanctions, in view of weak
control systems and the lack of a sufficiently adequate paper
trail."2 2' The Monitoring Mechanism reasoned that "those in-
volved in the illicit trade have continued to profit from war," in
part, because evidence of such illicit transactions is difficult to
obtain and because "no concrete steps have yet been taken to
control the trade in embargoed gems" beyond those measures
implemented by the governments of the countries targeted by
213. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 8-9.
214. Id. at 9.
215. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 9.
216. Diamonds: A Rebel's Best Friend, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.uk/
hi/english/world/Africa/newsid_754000/newsid745000/745194.stm (last visited Mar.
12, 2002).
217. Smuggling is Easy, supra note 184.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, Annex Letter from the Chairman of the Monitoring
Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA to the Chairman of the Security Council
and the President of the Security Council (Apr. 9, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/486, para.
77 (2002) (referencing U.N. Doc. S/2001/966, supra note 207).
221. Id.
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the embargoes.222 As noted by a U.N. Panel of Experts, the sale
of illicit African diamonds could not occur without willing buy-
ers. The panel concluded that "business has superceded secu-
rity concerns.
"M3
B. A BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY AT STAKE
Diamonds are the centerpiece of a multi-national, multi-
billion dollar industry that has thrived on tradition, elitism, and
secrecy for hundreds of years. The legal diamond business oper-
ates behind closed doors, on handshakes and trust, in a trading
system that involves players from around the world. 224 The in-
dustry's initial reluctance to embrace the KP as a new way of
doing business is not surprising. International diamond firms
are not accustomed to sharing information freely and the indus-
try has historically avoided close scrutiny. 225 The diamond in-
dustry lacks transparency, which is evident from the irreconcil-
able trade statistics discussed above.226 Until conflict diamonds
surfaced from the seamy under-side of industry, this opaque
trading system enabled conflict diamonds to be traded without
detection or outside scrutiny.
One of the KP's primary purposes is to protect the world's
legitimate diamond trade, a $7 billion business.227 With dia-
mond mining companies producing an estimated 114 million
carats of rough diamonds annually, two million people around
the world make their living from the diamond industry.28 The
diamond pipeline begins at the diamond mines on four conti-
nents, in about twenty-six countries.229 De Beers plays a large
role in diamond mining, owning about forty percent of the
world's diamond mines and regulating world prices for unpol-
222. Id. paras. 78-79.
223. U.N. Doc. S/2001/357, supra note 156.
224. Government Affairs Hearing, supra note 9; Smillie, supra note 84, § 3.1 (de-
scribing the international diamond trade as "secretive, iconoclastic, exploitive
and... 'still pretty medieval'"); see also GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE §§ 1-2
(1998), available at http://www.globalwitness.com.
225. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 12.
226. Id. at 8.
227. See generally World Diamond Council, supra note 7.
228. Id.
229. GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: POSSIBILrrIEs FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION, CERTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF DIAMONDs § 1 (2000), available at
http://www.globalwitness.com. This report was partially funded by the U.N. De-
partment of the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. See id.
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ished stones with a large "buffer" or excess stock.230 A De Beers
Group company, the Central Selling Organization, manages this
buffer stock by purchasing approximately seventy percent of the
world's rough diamond output. 23 After the rough diamonds are
purchased, they are sent to London for sorting into approxi-
mately 5,000 categories by size and quality.232 Next, the dia-
monds are distributed to diamond cutting centers and to dealers
in Antwerp, where approximately eighty-five percent of the
rough diamond trade occurs. Other major trading centers in-
clude London, Lucerne, New York, Tel Aviv, Johannesburg,
Bombay, and Dubai.2 3 ' The same rough diamond may be traded
several times at major trading centers before being sold to a
manufacturer.235
Diamonds are then processed in one of approximately thirty
countries. Cutting and polishing diamonds occurs primarily
in South Africa, Botswana, Russia, China, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Vietnam, and Mauritius, while major manufacturing (jewelry-
making) centers are located in Israel, Belgium, India, and NewV 237
York. Mining, processing, distributing, and retailing enable
the annual sale of 67 million pieces of diamond jewelry world-• 238
wide. By the year 2005, world production is expected to in-
crease to over 120 million carats, worth in excess of $9 billion.239
Diamonds have been valued for centuries and are one of the
world's most concentrated forms of wealth.24' The growth and
230. GOREUX, supra note 72, para. 5. By late 1998, De Beers had amassed a
stockpile of diamonds nearly equivalent to a full year of world production. Id. para.
10. De Beers has, however, reduced this buffer stock from $5 billion to less than $3
billion in 2000, in an attempt to change its image from "cartel manager" to "supplier
of choice." Id.
231. Id. para. 5.
232. World Diamond Council, supra note 7; see also GOREUX, supra note 72,
para. 5.
233. GOREUX, supra note 72, para. 5. See Smillie, supra note 84, § 3.3, for a dis-
cussion of the historical reasons for Belgium's preeminent role in the diamond in-
dustry, and an analysis of Belgium's diamond trade.
234. See GOREUX, supra note 72, para. 5.
235. Id. at 2 n.1.
236. World Diamond Council, supra note 7.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. For over a thousand years, diamonds were extremely rare, found only in
India for most of that period. One of the earliest known references to diamonds is
found in a Sanskrit manuscript, entitled "The Lesson of Profit," dating from 320-296
BC. During this period, rough diamonds were believed to confer supernatural pow-
ers or protection upon the bearer. See Diamonds through the Ages, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, at http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/diamonds/timeline.html (last
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success of the industry, and the mass consumption of diamonds
as the most legitimate and acceptable symbol of marital en-
gagement, is largely a result of the most successful marketing
campaign of the Twentieth Century. 241 The De Beers company
created the image of the diamond solitaire as a symbol of love in
the 1930s to recover dwindling sales after the Great Depres-
sion.242 By 1950, within three years after instituting its "Dia-
monds are Forever" advertising slogan, an estimated eighty per-
cent of engagements in the United States were consecrated with
diamond rings.243 Men and women from the United States,
Europe, and Japan (and increasingly China) now buy into the
concept that a diamond engagement ring is the "traditional" en-
gagement token.244  De Beers can be credited with single-
handedly creating this notion in less than a century.245
De Beers sells about eighty percent of the world's annual
diamond production and has monopolized the diamond industry
for most of the past century.246 Spending $60.4 million in adver-
tising in 1997, the De Beers media budget generally ranks in
the top ten of all U.S. advertisers.247 De Beers continues to ad-
vertise aggressively. As a result of the De Beers "Diamonds are
Forever" campaign, the perception of diamonds as a symbol of
love and wealth is well entrenched in the psyche of people from
around the world, particularly in the United States.24 '8 A prod-
uct built on a successful marketing strategy, however, could fall
from grace at the hands of a negative publicity campaign em-
phasizing the association of diamonds with mutilated and mur-
dered women and children.249
visited Sept. 25, 2002).
241. Jacki Lynden & Michael Montgomery, DeBeers and the Diamond Mystique,
available at http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/diamonds/mystique2.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2002). When diamonds were discovered in Kimberley, South
Africa in 1867, they were converted into an industrial product like copper. Id.
When diamonds hit the western market after the Kimberley discovery, prices
dropped from $500 to $0.10 per carat. Id.
242. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 224.
243. Lynden & Montgomery, supra note 241.
244. Cockburn, supra note 35, at 28. In 1967, five percent of Japanese women
received diamond engagement rings, whereas by 1981, this figure reportedly rose to
sixty percent. GOREUX, supra note 72, at 4 n.4.
245. Cockburn, supra note 35, at 28.
246. Nicholas Stein, The De Beers Story: A New Cut on an Old Monopoly,
FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 186.
247. Lisa Lockwood, Fashion's Deep Pockets, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, May 15,
1998, at 4B.
248. See Lynden & Montgomery, supra note 241.
249. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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Negative publicity and horror spurred international coop-
eration to support the KP. In 1998, the London-based organiza-
tion Global Witness, thrust the dirty little secret of the diamond
industry into public consciousness when it exposed the role of
diamonds in the decade-long Angolan conflict. When protest-
ers picketed outside Tiffany Company on Fifth Avenue, the dia-
mond trade community quickly recognized the potential for
disaster.25' The New York Post reported in November 1999 that
sparkling diamond gifts from swanky Fifth Avenue jewelry
stores might be financing cannibal gangs in Sierra Leone.252
Fearing consumer boycotts, the diamond industry and diamond-
producing countries reluctantly embraced the concept of a certi-
fication scheme to avoid the kind of negative publicity campaign
that all but killed the fur trade. In 2000, despite NGO efforts
to increase public awareness of the true price of diamonds from
conflict regions, diamond sales soared to the highest on record.254
Although these concerns have yet to diminish diamond sales,
the NGO efforts have been successful in making the industry
accountable for the conflict diamond dilemma. 2 5 De Beers an-
nounced it would no longer trade in diamonds from conflict-
ridden mines and the industry now fully supports the KP.256
More than seventy NGOs can be credited with bringing the cer-
tification scheme to fruition, largely by capturing the attention
and support of the diamond industry.27 The NGOs have acted
largely in partnership with KP Participants, though they have
250. See GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 224.
251. Editorial, Diamond Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A24.
252. Cockburn, supra note 35, at 28.
253. Chris McGreal, Hopes and Fears as Plan to Ban War Gems Begins,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2000, at 20; see also The World Diamond Council Technical
Committee, A System for International Rough Diamond Export and Import Controls,
at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/system.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2002)
("The diamond industry... seeks to cooperate with the United Nations and govern-
ments to ensure that conflict diamonds are excluded from the legitimate diamond
trade through implementation of an efficient and workable system of international
diamond controls.").
254. Cockburn, supra note 35, at 28.
255. See Nicholas Shaxson, Transparency in the International Diamond Trade,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT, available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org
/download/gidiamond trade.pdf (explaining that, as a result of Global Witness' "A
Rough Trade" report on conflict diamonds from Angola, De Beers announced in Feb-
ruary 2000 that it would no longer purchase African gems from conflict areas con-
trolled by rebel forces).
256. Id.
257. See Kimberley Process Stalled?, OTHER FACETS No. 2, June 2001, at 1-4
(Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, Ont., Int'l Peace Serv., Antwerp, Network
Movement for Justice & Dev., Freetown).
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steadfastly advocated for tough and effective KP standards.
Both the international community and the diamond industry
are keenly aware of NGO intimations that a campaign to drive
consumers away from diamonds could result if KP Participants
do not agree to close the loopholes left by ineffective U.N. sanc-
tions with more effective and stricter regulations.259
Diamonds seem inalienably wedded to love, marriage,
money, and power and diamond sales have yet to be marred by
the blood gem trade.26 ° Although it may seem incomprehensible
that the entrenched concept of diamonds as a symbol of wealth,
power, and the gift of marital engagement could ever be disman-
tled in the world psyche, one need only recall the fall from fash-
ion of fur coats in the United States in the latter part of the
Twentieth Century.261 A similar blow to the U.S. diamond mar-
258. NGO's have participated throughout the development of the KP as official
.observers," and have been "invited to take part in plenary meetings." KP Working
Doc. 112002, supra note 5, §1, at 4.
259. Diamond Industry Reacts to Charges that it's Letting Trade in 'Blood Dia-
monds' Pay for African Wars, CNN.CoM, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/
europe/07/17/belgium.diamond.congress/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2002); see also OTHER
FACETS No. 5, Mar. 2002, at 2 (Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, Ont., Int'l Peace
Info. Serv., Antwerp, Network Movement for Justice and Development, Freetown,
South Africa), available at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org/pdf/
OtherFacets5.pdf (referring to the comments of Jeff Fisher, President of the Dia-
mond Manufacturers and Importers Association at a Feb. 3, 2002 jewelry show in
Orlando, Florida, who warned that NGOs might lash out in 'sheer frustration' if U.S.
diamond legislation continues to falter in the Senate).
260. Although diamonds sales did drop by one percent after the tragedy of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, this represented the first drop in the industry in more than a dec-
ade. Peggy Jo Donahue, 2001 Diamond Jewelry Sales Down 1%, PROF. JEWELER
MAG., Mar. 28, 2002, available at http://professionaljeweler.polygon.
net/archives/news/2002/032802storyl.html. This slight decline reflected a three per-
cent decline in the transaction value of the diamonds purchased in a notably weak
economy, whereas the number of transactions actually increased by two percent. In
comparison, the industry boasted a twelve percent growth rate in 2000. Id.
261. Between 1919 to 1921, 107,689,927 "pelts from 125 different species were
auctioned in the United States alone." Respect for Animals, at
http://www.respectforanimals.org/facts/endangered.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
Furs were still highly fashionable in the early 1960s, when Jacqueline Kennedy
sported a leopard skin coat. Id. This set a fashion trend for leopard, cheetah, and
jaguar coats, handbags and trousers. Id. As a result, 50,000 leopard skins were ex-
ported from Eastern Africa in 1964 alone. Id. Today, of course, many wild animals
are protected as endangered species or they have been rendered extinct. Nonethe-
less, the fur industry's decline can be directly attributed to increased consumer
awareness about animal suffering. Press Release, The Humane Society of the United
States, The HSUS Is Encouraged by Decline in Domestic Mink Industry (Aug. 29,
2001), available at http://www.hsus.orgace/11913. This is not to suggest that the
fur industry has been nullified. Id. Although mink pelt production in the United
States totaled in excess of 2.5 million in 2001, this represents a steady decline since
1983, when production was over four million. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS
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ket could result in a shock to the world diamond market.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
With failing U.N. sanctions and mounting pressure from
NGOs, the southern African diamond-producing countries initi-
ated a "self-help" meeting in Kimberley, South Africa in May
2000 to discuss normative standards to deter the trade of con-
flict diamonds.6 2 After several meetings, the certification
263
scheme began to take shape and build momentum. The U.N.
endorsed the concept of establishing a global blocking system for
conflict diamonds in its December 1, 2000 Resolution 55/56,
which was co-sponsored by forty-eight nations and adopted
unanimously by 189 nations. 264  The U.N. acted pursuant to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to address international peace
and security threats caused by the illicit diamond trade and
called for Members to develop acceptable minimum standards
for rough diamond certification. 26 5 The "self-help" initiative be-
came known as the "expanded" KP, involving the U.N. and rep-
resentatives from over thirty-five nations, the WDC, the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC), 266 the European
Union (EU), the World Customs Organization, and various
NGOs. 267  A dozen plenary meetings have taken place since
SERVICE (NASS), U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, MINK 2001 (July 2002), available at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/mt/pressrls/livestoc/mink.txt. At the same time, domestic
mink farms, which totaled 1,098 in 1983, have dropped by seventy percent, to about
324 in 2001. Id. Moreover, when today's numbers are compared to the 5.7 million
pelts that were produced in 1969 (when NASS first began keeping such statistics),
the fur industry's decline is significant. Telephone Interview with Tom Krutchen,
NASS, Agricultural Statistics Board, (Aug. 19, 2002) (referencing the NASS 1969
mink report). "The continued decline in the industry is... a result of increased pub-
lic awareness about the inhumane treatment of animals inherent in fur farming.
Public opposition to fur fashion continues to grow..." Press Release, The Human
Society of the United States, supra.
262. See Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 20, at 2.
263. See G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 2.
264. Id.
265. Id. para. 1, 5. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Articles 39-51, pertains to
"Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression." Id.
266. SADC comprises Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Leso-
tho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Charles Mangwiro, Mozambique: African
Ministers Discuss Peace in Angola, Congo, REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 22,
2002.
267. See Kimberley Process, supra note 5.
[Vo1.12:1
2003] THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: CONFLICT DIAMONDS 35
2000.268
Although international cooperation and industry involve-
ment is impressive, some have likened the KP to "a watchdog
without teeth."269 Many fear that the system will facilitate the
concealment of conflict diamonds within commerce.27 ° On Feb-
ruary 12, 2001, a coalition of seven NGOs issued a "report card"
. ... . 271
evaluating the KP initiatives. It included an "A" for good in-
tentions and hard work and an "F" for compliance with the U.N.
General Assembly's call for an "effective, pragmatic and trans-
parent" system.272 One of the NGOs' principal concerns has been
the international discordance on compliance with WTO obliga-
273tions.
A meeting in Botswana in November 2001 failed to result in
a final agreement, so another "final" meeting was held in Ot-
tawa in March 2002.274 Just before the Ottawa meeting, the Di-
rector of International Affairs and Trade at the General Ac-
counting Office and others expressed concern that the scheme
still lacked "important elements". They suggested that consid-
erable challenges remained before an effective certification
scheme could be established.27 5
268. See Canada's Human Security website to review nine of the twelve final
communiques from the plenary meetings held between September 2000 and March
2002. Dept. of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Trade, Canada, Canada's Human Security, at
http:// www.humansecurity.gc.ca/conflictprevdiamonds-e.asp (last visited Oct. 13,
2002).
269. International Coalition Issues Kimberley Process Report Card,
DIAMOND.NET (Feb. 13, 2002), at http://www.diamonds.net (last visited Feb. 15,
2002).
270. Id.
271. Id. The following NGOs are included: Amnesty International, Fatal Trans-
actions, Global Witness, Oxfam International, Partnership Africa Canada, Physi-
cians for Human Rights, and World Vision. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. The NGOs have also been concerned that the KP lacked a system to
compile trade statistics on rough diamond production, importing and exporting. Id.
The NGOs express concern that the KP has a weak independent monitoring of na-
tional systems and industry warranties, and advocated for a dispute resolution
mechanism and adequate deterrents for countries that fail to meet minimum stan-
dards. Id.
274. See PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA ET AL., NGO REPORT ON OTTAWA
KIMBERLEY PROCESS MEETING, at http://action.web.ca/home/pac/attach/NGO
report.rtf (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (stating that the Ottawa meeting was
"unplanned," in that the November 2001 Botswana meeting "technically finalized
agreement on the minimum standards;" however, the Ottawa meeting was
necessary "because there were too many loose ends after Botswana, and these
required attention before there could be any real agreement").
275. Danielle Knight, U.S. Senators Push Law Against 'Conflict Diamonds',
INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4912862 (quoting Loren
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These concerns slowed what was a flurry of support for
the KP into a sputtering effort, which was teetering on the brink
of collapse. While progress was made in Ottawa, another "final"
meeting is scheduled for November 2002 in Switzerland.276 The
U.N. adopted resolution 56/263 in March 2002, 277 which pro-
vided a legal underpinning for the KP and further boosted its
legitimacy."' The resolution welcomed the KP certification
scheme and called on all nations to participate.27 9 The U.N. is
expected to further its endorsement of the KP when the agree-
ment is finalized.28 ° South Africa, which chaired the process un-
der the U.N., urged that those countries that can begin issuing
KP certificates should do so immediately and all other countries
should start full implementation by the end of 2002.281 KP Par-
ticipants intended the Switzerland meeting to be a "simultane-
282ous launch" of the certification regime.
D. THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The KP Participants drafted a political agreement between
the participating countries that establishes a rough diamond
certification scheme. 24 The Working Document sets forth stan-
dards and additional recommendations for Participants to follow
in implementing national legislation designed to control the con-
flict diamond trade.285 As a signatory to the final KP agreement,
Participants are politically bound to act in good faith and im-
Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the General Accounting Office).
276. See Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 20, at 2.
277. G.A. Res. 56/263, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 96th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/56/263 (2002).
278. See Andre Parker, et al., End to Trade in 'Conflict Diamonds' Moves Closer,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.orglsecurity/issues/
diamond/ft112901.htm.
279. Id.
280. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § VI (6).
281. Id.; see also Letter from the Charge d'affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission
of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Report on
the Kimberley Process Submitted to the General Assembly Pursuant to Assembly
Resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex 1, at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/56/775 (2002).
282. KP Final Communique, supra note 10.
283. See Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 20, paras. 6, 8, at 2 (ex-
plaining that the European Commission was authorized to negotiate an agreement
on behalf of the European Union and though most of the major objectives were met,
"the negotiations will not lead to the formal agreement initially envisaged"); see also
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
284. See Proposal for a Council Regulation supra note 20, at 3, para. 3.
285. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, para. 10, at Preamble.
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plement the minimum standards contemplated by the regime."6
Stricter measures are set forth as recommended standards, but
are not required for participation. 87 In summary, the certifica-
tion scheme envisages that Participants will implement laws
such that all imports and exports of rough diamonds are accom-
panied by a valid KP certificate. 28  Both the process for issuing
the certificates and the form of the certificates themselves
should meet specified minimum standards.28 s Participants will
be expected to ensure that rough diamond shipments are im-
290ported and exported in tamper resistant containers and are
not imported or exported to or from a non-participating coun-
try.
291
Although the global scheme is intended to apply to all
"rough diamonds," the Working Document defines conflict dia-
monds as,
[Riough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate government, as described in
relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar
as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolution which
may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognized in
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56 or in
similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in the future.2
4 2
With this definition in mind, the Working Document pro-
vides that Participants should "establish a system of controls
designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from
286. Although the KP agreement will not result in a formal treaty, it will still
bind Participants as a diplomatic or political obligation. Even though a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) or political agreement is not generally legally binding
under international law, "it does not mean that a state is free, politically or morally,
to disregard them." See AUST, supra note 14, at 39. Political agreements obligate
governments to deal in good faith. Id.
287. See generally KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, at Annex I(B), Annex
II-III (setting forth additional recommendations for the implementation of the certi-
fication scheme).
288. Id. § II (a). "KP Certificate" is defined in the working document as "a for-
gery resistant document with a particular format which identifies a shipment of
rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements of the certification
regime." Id. § 1.
289. Id. § II (b)-(c).
290. Id. § IV(c).
291. Id. § III (c).
292. KP Working Doc. 12002, supra note 5, § 1. UNGA Resolution 55/56 called
for the international community to develop a certification scheme for rough dia-
monds. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 2. "Relevant" UNSC Resolutions are referred to
in the Preamble of the Working Document and include UNSC 1173 (1998), 1295
(2000), and 1343 (2001). See supra note 9.
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shipments of rough diamonds."292 It would not be commercially
viable to determine the origin of each rough diamond shipment
based on geo-scientific methods. Moreover, such scientific
analyses can only qualitatively determine the likely origin. 294 It
would therefore not be feasible for Participants' "Importing Au-
thorities"2 95 to implement certification schemes based on the
proven non-conflict origin of each shipment. In order to comply
with the obligation posed by the KP to establish a regime that
will eliminate conflict diamond imports and exports, Partici-
pants must apply their national certification schemes to all
rough diamonds, regardless of origin.
The certificates of each participating country must, at a
minimum, "bear the title 'Kimberley Process Certificate,' the KP
logo, and the statement: "[tihe rough diamonds in this shipment
have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the
Kimberley Process international certification scheme for rough
diamonds."296 The certificate may be printed in any language, as
long as an English translation is incorporated into the text.297
Additionally, the certificates must be tamper-proof and forgery-
resistant.9  They must include the country of origin of the
shipment and a unique sequential number with the proper
country code identifier. 299  The certificates must also contain
general information regarding the shipment itself, including the
following: identification of the importer and exporter, date of is-
suance and expiration, total value and number of parcels in the
shipment, carat weight or mass, and quality characteristics of
the diamonds.3°° Finally, the certificates must identify the Rele-
vant Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
293. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV(a) (emphasis added).
294. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey P. Sgambat, Vice President of Arcadis,
(Sept. 10, 2002).
295. "Importing Authority" is defined by the Working Document as the "author-
ity(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Participant into whose territory a shipment of
rough diamonds is imported to conduct all import formalities and particularly the
verification of accompanying Certificates." Id. § I.
296. KP Working Doc. 112002, supra note 5, at Annex I(a).
297. Id.
298. Id. The certificates will likely be made using a cotton-based security paper
with chemical additives to avoid tampering, LTV activated fibers, micro printing, wa-
termarks, UV ink, and other non-disclosed security features. See Press Release,
Kimberly Process, Final Communiqu6 Brussels Meeting, 25 to 27 April 2001 (Apr.
25, 2001) Annexure A, available at http://www.kimberlyprocess.orgfBulletinDisplay
.asp?key=10.
299. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, at Annex I (a). The codes to be Al-
pha 2 country code identifiers, pursuant to ISO 3166-1. Id.
300. Id.
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subheading, °1 along with an official validation by the Partici-
pant's designated competent exporting authority or government
issuing agency.3 2 Additional details are recommended but not
required.3 °3
When diamonds are imported into a Participant's territory,
the Participant's "Importing Authority" should expeditiously
confirm the receipt of a rough diamond shipment with the ex-
porting country's appropriate authorities using the certificate
number, the number of parcels, carat weight, and the identify-
ing data of the importer and exporter of record.3 4 Additionally,
the Working Document recommends that an e-mail be sent from
the "Exporting Authority"30 5 to the Importing Authority before or
upon the arrival of the shipment detailing the information con-
tained on the certificate, including the serial number of the cer-t 306
tificate. To this end, it is recommended that an additional
portion of the certificate be used for import confirmation with
the identity of the importer, the country of destination, the
carat, the weight, and the value of the shipment in U.S. dol-l 307
lars. These certificates should be retained and be accessible
by customs officials for at least three years.08 As extra meas-
ures, Participants may require that their diamond exports be
shipped in transparent security bags with the certificate serial
number replicated on the shipping container. 0 9 In the event
that a rough diamond shipment merely transits310 the territory
of a Participant, the certification scheme does not obligate Par-
ticipants to ensure the shipments are accompanied by a certifi-
. 1 - 311
cate or to maintain any record of the transshipment.
301. See id.
302. Id. at Annex I(b).
303. Id.
304. Id. § III (b).
305. The Working Document defines "Exporting Authority" as "the author-
ity(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Participant from whose territory a shipment of
rough diamonds is leaving, and which are authorised to validate the Kimberley
Process Certificate." KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § I.
306. Id. at Annex 11(19), (21).
307. Id. at Annex I(b).
308. Id. § III(b).
309. Id. at Annex I(c).
310. Under the KP scheme, "transit" means "the physical passage across the ter-
ritory of a Participant or a non-Participant, with or without transshipment, ware-
housing or change in mode of transport, when such passage is only a portion of a
complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant
or non-Participant across whose territory a shipment passes." Id. § I.
311. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § III (d). This provides that the Par-
ticipant's designated authorities ensure the shipment leaves that territory un-
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In addition to the use of KP certificates, participating coun-
tries are expected to implement internal controls to ensure that
conflict diamonds are not imported or exported from their terri-
tories.1 Respecting the sovereignty of each Participant, these
internal controls are set forth in the KP Working Document as a
basic framework to provide Participants with broad discretion.
This should include at least the following: (1) the designation of
an Importing and Exporting Authority; (2) the enactment or
amendment of laws or regulations necessary to implement and
enforce the certification scheme; and (3) appropriate penalties
for transgressions."4 As additional measures, the Working
Document recommends that these internal controls include the
appointment of one or more officials to coordinate the imple-
mentation of the scheme.31'
To ensure transparency, Participants should make informa-
tion regarding a Participant's relevant laws, regulations, rules,
procedures, and practices, along with regular updates availableto all" . •316
to all signatories. Participants are expected to compile and
maintain relevant data regarding production, importing and ex-
porting.317 Further, this information should be made freely
available to all Participants.3 1 8  Additionally, the Working
Document recommends that a computerized database be main-
tained with both importing and exporting statistics and that the
contents of the KP certificates be utilized to complement or en-• t. .- 319
hance the statistical information.
Participants are further expected to cooperate fully with
other Participants, to share information with respect to prob-
lems encountered or solutions found, and to assist other Partici-
pants in the improvement of the certification schemes within
opened, without tampering, and otherwise in an identical state as when it entered.
See id.
312. Id. § IV(a).
313. See id., paras. 13, 15, at Preamble (stating, respectively, that "an interna-
tional certification scheme for rough diamonds will only be credible if all Partici-
pants have established internal systems... while taking into account that differ-
ences in production methods and trading practices as well as differences in
institutional controls thereof may require different approaches to meet minimum
standards;" and that "state sovereignty should be fully respected and the principles
of equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to").
314. Id. § rV.
315. Id. at Annex II(1).
316. Id. § V(a).
317. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV(e).
318. Id. §§ IV, V.
319. Id. at Annex II(2)-(3).
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their territories.32 ° Internally, an integrated agency approach is
encouraged, with close cooperation between customs agencies
and law enforcement.32'
The scheme encourages diamond-producing countries to en-
sure that diamond mines are licensed and that mining is re-
stricted to only those licensed mines.322 It states that mining
countries should ensure that licensed mining companies and
prospectors maintain adequate security measures.2  Addition-
ally, the Working Document urges diamond-producing countries
to maintain information and analyses of the amount of actual
production, as well as the characteristics and qualities of the
diamonds produced.3 24  As an added measure, diamond-
producing countries with rebel groups within their territory are
encouraged, but not required, to identify these conflict areas to
all other Participants and to update this information regu-
larly.320
Annual plenary meetings of Participants, representatives of
civil society, the diamond industry, non-participating govern-
ments, and international organizations will be held to improve
.- 326
the scheme's effectiveness. The agenda at these meetings will
include reviewing the status of each Participant's internal certi-
fication scheme, as well as determining whether additional veri-
fication measures are necessary.327 Consensus of the Partici-
pants or consultations with the Chair, in the event that
consensus is impossible, is necessary for decision-making, in-
cluding decisions to modify the KP agreement itself.328 Ad hoc
working groups may be established at these plenary meetings to
solve specific problems. 329 Additionally, "review missions" may
be established for compliance verification "where there are
credible indications of significant non-compliance" by a given
• • 330
Participant. Compliance verification reports and the com-
ments from the subject Participant regarding the report will be
posted on an official KP website in a strictly confidential re-
320. Id. § IV(E); see also id. para. 15, Preamble (stating that "the principles of
equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to").
321. Id. at Annex IH(9).
322. Id.
323. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, at Annex II(10).
324. Id. at Annex 11(8).
325. Id., at Annex 1(5).
326. Id. § VI (1), (10).
327. Id. § VI (11), (13).
328. Id. § VI(1), (5), (17).
329. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § VI(4).
330. Id. § VI(13)(b).
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stricted access section.33'
In addition to annual reviews, the Working Document pro-
vides for a comprehensive review mechanism to analyze the
scheme's overall effectiveness, the first to be held "no later than
three years after the effective starting date of the certification
scheme."332 These reviews will be scheduled with the annual
plenary meeting and will consider the continued threat posed by
conflict diamonds and the future of the scheme.333 The reviews
will consider the views of all Participants and NGOs, with great
weight given to the perception of the U.N.334
The KP sets out a basic framework and relies upon Partici-
pants to implement effective legislation. Assuming good faith,
the agreement respects the sovereignty of each country to im-
plement the minimum standards as each deems appropriate.3 5
The agreement states that Participants should enact legislation
with "dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgres-
sions."3  The commitment of all Participants will be the key to
the scheme's success.
III. THE U.S. EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT CONFLICT
DIAMOND LEGISLATION
Given the U.S. position as a global power, unequivocal U.S.
leadership in the implementation of the KP is essential.337
Moreover, the demand for diamonds in the United States is the
greatest in the world, with the United States annually import-
ing a great majority of globally-produced diamonds.338 In fiscal
year 2000, over $800 million in rough diamonds entered the
United States from fifty-three countries through several U.S.
ports of entry.339 These imports contribute significantly to the
U.S. diamond jewelry market, which was worth an estimated
$26 billion in 2000.340
When conflict diamonds became a focus in 1998, the United
331. Id. § VI (15).
332. Id. § VI (20).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
336. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV(d).
337. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
338. COOK, supra note 200, at 6.
339. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 11.
340. COOK, supra note 200, at 6.
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States began to enhance its control of rough diamond imports to
honor U.N. mandated sanctions.3 4' Pursuant to UNSC Resolu-
tion 1127, the United States prohibits the importation of all
diamonds from Angola, either directly or indirectly, unless a
certificate of origin accompanies the diamonds from the Angolan
Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.34 In January
2001, President Clinton issued an executive order to prohibit
the direct or indirect importation of rough diamonds from Sierra
Leone, unless accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by
the Government of Sierra Leone. 43 President George W. Bush
followed suit in May 2001, prohibiting the importation of rough
diamonds from Liberia, regardless of whether or not they origi-
nated in Liberia.4
Despite these sanctions, U.S. diamond imports are largely
subject to the same controls as other commodities. 45 Since 1998,
U.S. Customs officials have conducted approximately thirty-five
random inspections of mixed rough diamond shipments.34 6 The
inspections revealed only minor documentation discrepancies in
five cases.347 Customs officials attribute this to the fact that it is
virtually impossible, based on physical inspection, to determine
the original source of rough diamonds.4 8 Worldwide discrepan-
cies in the reporting statistics of diamond imports and exports
are reflected in U.S. trade statistics.349 For example, Belgium
reportedly exported $355 million worth of rough diamonds to
the United States in 2000.3'0 The United States reportedly
bought only $192 million dollars of rough diamonds from Bel-
gium.3
51
The United States is unable to determine the true origin of
diamond imports or to block conflict diamonds with its current
import control system.352 Given that rough diamonds are easily
imported from countries other than the actual country of origin,
341. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 10.
342. 31 C.F.R. § 590 was implemented pursuant to Executive Order 13098.
343. Exec. Order No. 13194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7389 (Jan. 19, 2001).
344. Exec. Order No. 13213, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,829 (May 27, 2001).
345. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 10.
346. Id. at 11. Customs suspended these inspections after September 11, 2001
however, they were resumed in May 2002. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 25, at 14.
347. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 11.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 8.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 10.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
the United States remains susceptible to conflict diamond im-
ports. 3  It follows that, due to the U.S. demand for diamonds,
U.S. legislation that ensures that conflict diamonds cannot be
imported into the United States would significantly strengthen
the effectiveness of a global certification scheme. Strong sup
port of the KP by the United States would provide an incentive
to diamond-exporting countries and trade centers to implement
acceptable safeguards against conflict diamonds that coincide
with the enactment of U.S. legislation.355
Passing U.S. conflict diamond legislation is as hard as dia-
monds themselves. Members in both the 106th and 107th Con-
gresses introduced conflict diamond legislation to implement a
certificate of origin for the importation of rough diamonds into
the United States in compliance with KP minimum standards,
without success.356 Congressman Tony Hall championed the
conflict diamond issue beginning in 1999. 357 He first introduced
the Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade
(CARAT) Act of 2000,358 which proposed that all gem-quality
diamonds valued in excess of $100, whether rough, polished, or
set in jewelry, be accompanied by a certificate of origin.355 It also
required the Secretary of the Treasury to report on the feasibil-
ity of marking gem quality stones with origin markings.6 0 Un-
fortunately, the bill did not get past the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection.6 1
Congressman Hall reinvented and reintroduced the CARAT
Act as House Bill 5147 in September 2000.362 This legislation
sought to impose an embargo against Angolan and Sierra Leon-
nean diamonds unless accompanied by certificates of origin from
353. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 10.
354. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 199 (prepared statement of Rep.
Tony Hall).
355. TAMM, supra note 31, at 28.
356. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 199 (prepared statement of Rep.
Tony Hall).
357. See id.
358. Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act of 2000, H.R.
3188, 106th Cong. (1999).
359. Id. § 3(a)(1).
360. Id. § 5.
361. Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, H.R. 3188, at
http://Thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl06query.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2002).
362. See Peggy Jo Donahue, WDC Says Congressional Bill Premature, PROF.
JEWELER MAG., Oct. 12, 2000, available at http://www.professionaljeweler.
com/archives/news/2000/101200story.html (explaining that HR 5147 was introduced
as a "follow-up" to CARAT Act).
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their respective governments.363 In addition, the embargo would
target known transshipment points of Angolan and Sierra
Leonnean diamonds, such as Liberia.364 The bill gave the Presi-
dent discretionary authority to waive the embargo against a
given country in response to a national security interest.365 Fi-
nally, the bill required the Secretary of the Treasury to require
certificates of origin for diamond imports.3 6 Again, this legisla-
tion failed to make it out of the House Subcommittee on
Trade.367
In October 2000, Congressman Hall again tried introduc-
ing the Conflict Diamonds Elimination Act.368 This bill was a
compromise between the diamond industry and NGOs.3 69 The
Act barred diamond imports from any exporting country unless
the exporter was either implementing a system of import/export
controls or participating in an international agreement that es-
tablished certain minimum controls. 370 This bill gave the Presi-
dent discretionary authority to grant indefinite biennial waivers
to a country in non-compliance if the President determined the
country was making significant progress toward one of the
above. 37' This bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on
Trade, but no further action was taken.372 Although none of the
legislation regarding conflict diamonds passed during the 106th
Congress, the bills kept the issue on the political agenda and
fostered support for the KP.
373
During the first session of the 107th Congress, conflict dia-
mond legislation was once again introduced in the House by
Representative Amo Houghton. 374  The Clean Diamond Trade
363. Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, H.R. 5147, at http://Thomas
.loc.gov/bss/dlO6query.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Conflict Diamonds Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 5564, 106th Cong. (2000).
369. See Julia M. Duncan, Conflict Diamond Bill Compromise Proposed, PROF.
JEWELER MAG., Nov. 2, 2000, available at http://www.professionaljeweler.com/
archives/news/2000/110200story.html.
370. H.R. 5564, § 2(a).
371. Id. § 5(c).
372. Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress: H.R. 5564, at
http://Thomas.loc.govlbss/dl06query.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2002).
373. Telephone Interview with Deborah DeYoung, Senior Aide to Congressman
Tony Hall (April 19, 2002).
374. See Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, H.R. 2722 IH, at
http://Thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl07query.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2002).
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Act 375 and its companion bill in the Senate376 were designed to
improve earlier legislation, House Bill 918 and Senate Bill
787.3" The diamond industry opposed House Bill 918, while
NGO's opposed Senate Bill 787, which was based on WDC draft
legislation.37 ' As introduced by Congressman Houghton, House
Bill 2722 placed import restrictions on rough diamonds, polished
diamonds, and jewelry containing diamonds.7 9 It provided
automatic triggers for sanctions against countries that failed to
implement "KP-type" measures."' The President's authority to
grant waivers to non-compliant countries was limited to a one-
time waiver for a six month period.38' This bill faced opposition,
especially from the Bush Administration, which wanted more
discretion in sanctions implementation.
A modified version of House Bill 2722 finally passed in the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 and went to the
Senate calendar.383  The Act defined "conflict diamonds," as
those "rough diamonds, the import of which is fueling conflict
and is prohibited by UNSC resolutions."384 Defining conflict
diamonds so narrowly means that blood diamonds from the
DRC would be excluded because such importation is not prohib-
ited by any UNSC resolution.385 The compromise bill revisions
were intended to make the legislation more palatable to the Ex-
ecutive Branch.386 It provided that the President may prohibit
the import of certain "rough diamonds into the United States
from any country that does not take certain measures to stop
the trade in conflict diamonds."387 The President's authority was
375. Clean Diamond Trade Act, H.R. 2722 IH, 107th Cong. (2001).
376. Clean Diamond Act, S. 1084, 107th Cong. (2001).
377. See Clean Diamonds Act, H.R. 918, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Conflict
Diamond Act of 2001, S. 787, 107th Cong. (2001).
378. See TAMM, supra note 31, at 29-30. House Bill 918 was co-sponsored by
Reps. Hall, Frank Wolfe, and Cynthia McKinney with the support of the U.S. Cam-
paign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, representing over seventy human rights or-
ganizations. Id. The rival bill, S 787, was introduced by Senator Judd Greg (R-NH).
Id.
379. H.R. 2722 §4(a)(1), (3).
380. Id. § 4(a)(1).
381. Id. § 6(a).
382. TAMM, supra note 31, at 30.
383. Clean Diamond Trade Act, H.R. 2722 PCS, 107th Cong. (2001).
384. Id. § 3(1).
385. See 148 CONG. REC. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tony
Hall).
386. Chris Rugaber, Sanctions: House Passes Legislation To Restrict Trade In
Conflict Diamonds After White House Deal, 18 BNA INT'L TRADE REP. (2001).
387. H.R. 2722 PCS § 4.
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qualified in that the prohibition must be (1) "necessary to pro-
tect essential security interests" of the United States, or (2)
"pursuant to the UNSC Resolutions on conflict diamonds," and
(3) "consistent with both the United States' foreign policy inter-
ests and international obligations."388 This language effectively
removed the automatic sanctions triggers and made Presiden-
tial waivers unnecessary. 3 9 Furthermore, to appease the indus-
try, the sanctions were not generally applicable to polished gems
and jewelry.390 The President could, in his discretion, prohibit
specific entries of polished diamonds and jewelry containing
diamonds "if the President ha[d] credible evidence that such
diamonds and jewelry were produced with conflict diamonds."391
Concerned that the congressional intent behind House-
passed Bill 2722 was severely diluted and compromised, Senator
Durbin, with co-sponsors Senators DeWine and Feingold, intro-
duced Senate Bill 2027 on March 18, 2002, also entitled the
"Clean Diamond Trade Act."392Senate Bill 2027 included a broad
definition of conflict diamonds, which included diamonds from
the conflict areas of the DRC as well as diamonds traded by the
terrorists named in President Bush's Executive Order 13224. 393
Whereas the version of House Bill 2722 that was placed on the
Senate calendar permitted the President to prohibit certain
diamond imports, the Senate version required the President to
prohibit the importation of rough diamonds from countries that
failed to take effective measures to curb the trade of conflict
diamonds if such a prohibition would have been in the foreign
policy interests of the United States.394 Additionally, the bill re-
quired the President to prohibit specific imports of polished
diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds if the President had
credible evidence that they were produced with conflict dia-
monds.395 Senate Bill 2027 affirmatively stated that "Articles
XX and XXI of GATT 1994 allow WTO Member countries to take
388. Id.
389. Id. See generally Rugaber, supra note 386.
390. See generally Clean Diamonds Trade Act, H.R. 2722 PCS, 107th Cong.
(2001).
391. H.R. 2722 PCS.
392. Clean Diamond Trade Act, S. 2027 IS, 107th Cong. (2002). This is a new
and improved version of Senator Durbin's "Clean Diamonds Act," Senate Bill 1084,
which was introduced in June 2001, but never made it out of the Committee on Fi-
nance. Id.
393. Id. § 3(1).
394. Id. § 4(a).
395. Id. § 5.
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measures to deal with situations such as that presented by the
current trade in conflict diamonds without violating their WTO
obligations, "396 reflecting the general consensus of the interna-
tional community.397
The 107th Congress will end without passing any conflict
diamond legislation for yet another session. While the U.S.
struggle for implementing legislation continues, the clock is
ticking on the target date for the international implementation
of the KP.39' Given that the United States has come under fire
for its trade policies, the failure to implement a conflict diamond
certification scheme through legislation or otherwise could be
yet another reason for international criticism of U.S. interna-
tional policies. 9
IV. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS IS CONSISTENT WITH
WTO OBLIGATIONS
The U.S. debate is matched by the struggle for consensus in
the international community, especially with respect to whether
the KP will be consistent with WTO obligations. The KP is a
multilateral effort designed primarily to foster both economic
and human security400 and is not founded in protectionism. 0 1
Despite the legal underpinning provided by U.N. endorsement,
some nations, notably the United States, Canada, and Japan,
have expressed concern that the KP may violate WTO obliga-
40tions.402 The universality requirement is the primary stumbling
block.403 This is the biggest hurdle to U.S. advocacy for a tough
certification scheme. °4 In a Senate hearing in early 2002, Rep-
resentatives Hall and Frank Wolfe charged that the competing
interests of various U.S. government agencies, including the
Department of Treasury and United States Trade Representa-
tive's office, interfered with U.S. efforts to stem the conflict dia-
mond trade.4 ' Representatives Hall and Wolfe stated that the
396. Id. § 2(7).
397. See infra notes 412-11 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
399. See infra notes 408-10 and accompanying text.
400. See KP Working Doc. 112002, supra note 5, paras. 1-3, 8, at Preamble.
401. See id.
402. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
403. See TAMM, supra note 31, at 31; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
404. TAMM, supra note 31, at 31.
405. Government Affairs Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Rep. Tony Hall and
Rep. Frank Wolfe).
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Bush Administration's excessive deference to WTO obligations
was "disturbing" and that more "muscular action" against con-
flict diamonds would be well within U.S. rights as a WTO Mem-
ber.4 °6
In KP negotiations, the United States and other countries
"often used the rules governing international trade.., as trump
cards to counter certain unpopular proposals."4 °7 The United
States, supported by other Participants, urged KP Participants
to ensure that the scheme would not violate WTO obligations
before finalizing the understanding.4 8 This would involve nu-
merous compromises before the KP could be adopted and would
delay the initiative, beyond its second targeted implementation
date.40 9 At the same time, a KP working group report, issued in
advance of the Ottawa meeting, concluded that import and ex-
port bans on rough diamonds would not contravene WTO re-
quirements if a credible reason and motivation necessitating
them existed.410
As the debate in Ottawa wore on, the Swiss delegation per-
suaded all Participants to move forward with the agreement.4"
The Swiss delegation achieved a consensus that the human and
national security provisions in the GATT, Articles XX (b) and
XXI, respectively, were sufficient to insulate the KP from WTO
inconsistency.412 For most Participants, the Swiss delegation al-
layed fears of a WTO challenge by pointing out that all the ma-
jor diamond producing and trading countries, as well as all five
Permanent Members of the Security Council, were KP Partici-
pants.413
The overly cautious position of the United States can be at-
tributed, in part, to the general conception that WTO rules do
not allow nations to discriminate between goods on a non-
product related basis.4 4 Commentators often strictly interpret
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Telephone Interview with Deborah DeYoung, supra note 373. The United
States has generally supported efforts to curb the conflict diamond trade. Id. The
United States backed UNSC sanctions targeting conflict diamonds and was a spon-
sor of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 55/56, which endorsed the establish-
ment of a global certification scheme. Id.
409. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, supra note 274; see also TAMM, supra note
31, at 31.
410. OTHER FACETS No. 5, supra note 259, at 2.
411. Id.; see also PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, supra note 274.
412. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, supra note 274.
413. Id.
414. See Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMS" In The WTO: De-
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WTO obligations as disallowing trade restrictions directed at
the Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) of a product.415
This general rule is intended to prevent countries from exerting
their values and non-product related standards upon other
countries.41 PPMs are often viewed as an imperialistic tool of
rich countries used to coerce poor countries into complying with
certain values, such as greater environmental protection or
higher labor standards.417
Unlike other PPM measures, the KP is not a unilateral,
self-protectionist measure. It was initiated by developing coun-
tries that have sought the cooperation of the international com-
munity.418 With respect to the WTO, developing countries most
often express concern that the developed countries will impose
trade barriers, such as environmental or labor restraints, that
will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the developing coun-
tries to meet.419 The KP turns the tables somewhat. Although
the developing diamond-producing countries are supporting the
KP largely out of fear that failure to do so would negatively af-
fect the legitimate diamond trade, they are nonetheless support-
ing the process.4 20 Because these nations have much to gain by
way of increased security, bolstered governmental control, sta-
bility, and increased tax revenues, they have asked the interna-
tional community for cooperation. 42' Developed countries, such
as the United States and Japan, which are not diamond produc-
ers, are largely importers of polished, rather than rough dia-122
monds. Nonetheless, they have expressed the most apprehen-
bunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 77 (2002) (citing European
Commission, Towards Sustainable Trade, Trade Policy Dialogue with Civil Society,
Ad-Hoc Meeting on PPMs, 31 May 2001).
415. Id. at 76 (arguing that trade restrictions based on processes and production
methods can be an appropriate instrument of environmental policy). The term
"processes and production methods" initially referred to product standards that fo-
cused on production methods as opposed to product characteristics, originating in
the 1979 GATT agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Id. at 64 (citing Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act, supra note 29, at An-
nex 1A, art. 2.12 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]).
416. Id. at 60.
417. Id. at 62-63.
418. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
419. See Steve Charnovitz, supra note 414, at 62-63.
420. See e.g., Diamond Diplomacy, supra note 251.
421. See 148 CONG. REC. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tony
Hall) (discussing the DRC, however, these statements are equally applicable to other
African nations struggling with conflict diamonds); see also Proposal for a Council
Regulation, supra note 20, para. 4, at 2.
422. After the discovery of diamond-bearing kimberlites in Canada's west-
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sion about WTO compliance."' The KP targets the procedures
for diamond mining, exporting, and importing. 2 1 In order to
trade in rough diamonds, the KP requires that certificates ac-
company diamond shipments according to the proscribed proc-
ess and procedure2 and it urges Participants to ensure, among
other things, that diamond mines are certified and that pros-
pecting and mining companies maintain effective security stan-
dards.42" The most notable WTO precedent regarding the legal-
ity of PPM measures is the WTO Appellate Body's 1998 decision
regarding U.S. import prohibitions on shrimp and shrimp prod-
ucts, that were trawled by commercial vessels without the use of
a sea turtle excluder device, which were comparable to U.S.
standards (the Shrimp-Turtle case).427 The Appellate Body con-
cluded that the U.S. import prohibitions violated GATT Article
XI as a quantitative trade restriction.4  Arguably, a nation's
KP-consistent legislation could be considered akin to the U.S.
law, Section 609 of Public Law 101-102, that led to the Shrimp-
Turtle decision, and therefore subject to a WTO challenge.429
central Northwest Territories in 1991, Canada has produced as much as fifteen per-
cent of the world's annual output. Ian Smillie, Fire in the Ice: Benefits, Protection
and Regulation in the Canadian Diamond Industry, at 2 (Partnership Africa Can-
ada, The Diamonds and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper No. 2), available
at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org. It is estimated that Canada's newly dis-
covered mines will produce $500 million dollars annually over the next eighteen
years. Id.
423. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
424. Smillie, supra note 422, at 68.
425. KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § IV.
426. Id., paras. 9-10, at Annex II.
427. See WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Import Prohibitions of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report].
428. Id. para. 187.
429. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-162, Title VI, § 609, 103 Stat. 1037
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2002)), provided in part that:
(b)(1) In general.-The importation of shrimp or products from shrimp
which have been harvested with commercial fishing technology which may
affect adversely such species of sea turtles shall be prohibited not later
than May 1, 1991, except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) Certification procedure.-The ban on importation of shrimp or products
from shrimp pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not apply if the President
shall determine and certify to the Congress not later than May 1, 1991, and
annually thereafter that-
(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided documen-
tary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program governing the
incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting
that is comparable to that of the United States; and
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This uncertainty regarding the implications of the Shrimp-
Turtle case specifically caused some U.S. reluctance in Ot-
tawa.
430
Corroborating U.S. reticence, the GAO's February 2002 re-
port determined that the KP could violate article XI of GATT,
but suggested that the general exceptions under Article XX and
the Article XXI security exception might provide allowances for
"KP-type" schemes. 431  Before determining whether a trade
measure fits within a WTO/GATT exception, however, it is nec-
essary to determine whether the measure is inconsistent with
WTO obligations.
A. GATT ARTICLE XI
GATT's Article XI prohibits countries from imposing quan-
titative restrictions or similar measures on the importation ofprodcts rom ther . •432
products from other countries. Article XI (1) of GATT provides
that,
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export li-
censes or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
member or on the exportation or sale for export of any product des-
tined for the territory of any other member.
4 33
A fundamental principle treaty interpretation is that
agreements "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in light of its object and purpose."434 Article
XI applies to prohibitions or restrictions instituted or main-
(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by the vessels of the har-
vesting nation is comparable to the average rate of incidental taking of
sea turtles by United States vessels in the course of such harvesting;
or
(C) the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation does
not pose a threat of the incidental taking of such sea turtles in the
course of such harvesting.
430. Telephone Interview with Deborah DeYoung, supra note 373.
431. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 12 n.13.
432. Id.
433. GATT 1947 referred to "contracting parties." This was amended in 1994:
"The references to "contracting party" in the provisions of GATT 1994 shall be deemed
to read "member." GATT, supra note 29, at art. XI(1) (emphasis added).
434. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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tained by any member."' The ordinary meaning of the term
"any," means "one indifferently out of any number, indicating a
person, thing, event, etc., as not a particular or determinate in-
dividual of the given category but whichever one chance may se-
lect; this, that or the other; one or another."4 36 Therefore, the
applicability of the Article XI is arguably limited to the actions
of one or another Member, not to a multilateral initiative en-
dorsed by the U.N. The use of the phrase "any member" in Arti-
cle XI and throughout the WTO Agreements indicates that the
WTO Agreements contemplate that trade measures that violate
GATT occur when a certain Member acts unilaterally, or even
plurilaterally, but not multilaterally.437
B. DOES THE KP MEET THE TWO-TIERED ANALYSIS REQUIRED
UNDER ARTICLE XX?
Even if the KP were determined to be inconsistent with
GATT Article XI, or another provision, the implementing legis-
lation of Participants would qualify as a general exception under
Article XX (b) of the GATT. Article XX (b) provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures ... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health...438
The Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body reiterated the two-tiered
method for applying Article XX. First, the measure must be
provisionally justified under the applicable Article XX excep-
tion-in this case, Article XX (b).439 Second, the measure must
be appraised under the Article XX "chapeau," or introductory
clause.4 Supporting the applicability of this analysis, the KP
Working Group issued a report in advance of the Ottawa ple-
nary meeting concluding that rough diamond trade restrictions
would not contravene WTO requirements if a credible reason
435. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XXI.
436. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 121 (2d ed. 1939).
437. See supra notes 434-34 and accompanying text.
438. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XX (b) (emphasis added).
439. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 113.
440. Id. para. 118 (citing Report of the Appellate Body Concerning United States
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 29, 1996,
WT/DS2/AB/R, at 22, available at http://www.wto.org).
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and motivation existed that required them.44'
In ascertaining whether the KP is necessary to protect hu-
man health under Article XX (b), one only needs to look at the
U.N.'s level of effort with respect to its peace-keeping in Africa.
The U.N. has expended tremendous effort to bring peace to Af-
442
rica. In light of these efforts, the U.N.'s endorsement of the
KP is de facto testimony to the initiative's necessity. The KP
has evolved from the tremendous involvement of the interna-
tional community, including the five Permanent Members of the
UNSC and the diamond-producing countries.43 Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that any WTO Dispute Resolution Body would
second-guess the better judgment of these collective sovereign
nations as to the necessity of the KP's universality requirement.
The KP, even if justified under Article XX (b) as necessary
to protect human health, must still be consistent with the intro-
ductory clause of Article XX.4" This chapeau is an expression of
the international principle of good faith.4 ' It is a fundamental
principle of international law that countries shall "refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty."446
The Article XX chapeau recognizes the balance of rights and ob-
ligations between Members' rights to invoke Article XX excep-
tions on one hand and the substantive rights of the other Mem-
bers on the other.4 4 7  "[T]hat is to say that the ultimate
availability of the exception is subject to the compliance by the
invoking Member with the requirements of the chapeau.' 45
While Members may enact certain measures, such as those de-
signed to protect human health, the measures must be consis-
tent with the object and purpose of the multilateral trading sys-
tem.449  Those measures may not constitute "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, nor [be] a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade.'"5"
The Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body considered whether the
441. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, supra note 259, at 2.
442. See generally supra notes 35-37, 152-59 and accompanying text (highlight-
ing some of the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts).
443. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
444. See Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 118.
445. Id. para. 158.
446. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 434, art. 18.
447. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 118.
448. Id. para. 157.
449. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XX.
450. Id.
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U.S. law under scrutiny in that case was unjustifiably discrimi-
natory.45 1 The Appellate Body determined that U.S. law was con-
spicuously flawed because of its coercive effects as essentially an
economic embargo: WTO Members had to comply with the U.S.
standard for shrimp trawling in order to obtain their WTO trad-
452ing rights. In making this determination, the Appellate Body
concluded that the multilateral trading system could not tolerate
economic embargoes employed by "one WTO Member" that re-
quire others to adhere to the same regulatory program to achieve
the policy goals in force within that Member's territory, without
consideration of the different conditions occurring within the ter-
ritories of those other Members.453
The KP could be considered an embargo of sorts against non-
Participants because it does propose to treat Participants differ-
ently from non-Participants, which would have implications for
some WTO Members.454 This argument is negated, however, by
the fact that the KP agreement is open for the signature of all
countries.4 5  Moreover, the KP trade measures to be imple-
mented by Participants are intended to apply equally to all dia-
mond trading countries "where the same conditions prevail," as
required by GATT Article XX(b).456  The conditions within the
territories of non-Participants will not be the same as within the
territories of Participants. Conflict diamonds will be more easily
imported into non-participating countries because there will be
no certification requirement for their diamond imports. This is a
sufficient difference of condition to justify treating the diamonds
from Participants differently from the diamonds of non-
Participants.
It is possible, however, that a non-Participant could enact
KP-like minimum standards but fail to become a signatory to the
KP agreement. The Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body analysed the
application of U.S. law in this regard and concluded that shrimp
trawled with methods that were fully compliant with the U.S.
standard would be excluded from the U.S. market solely because
the shrimp have been caught in waters not certified by the
United States.457 The Appellate Body stated that this possible
451. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 160.
452. Id. para. 161.
453. Id. para. 164.
454. See id. para. 161.
455. KP Working Document 112002, supra note 5, § VI(8).
456. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XX (b).
457. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 165.
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application of U.S. law was "difficult to reconcile with the de-
clared policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles."5
The Appellate Body suggested that the U.S. prohibition was more
concerned with influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially
the same regulatory regime as that applied domestically to U.S.
shrimp trawlers, even though many WTO Members may have
been differently situated. 9 The Appellate Body articulated its
belief that discrimination results when countries in which the
same conditions prevail are treated differently, as well as when
measures are applied without "any inquiry into the appropriate-
ness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in
those countries. ' 6 °
The Appellate Body did not end its inquiry of the discrimi-
natory application of Section 609 with its analysis of whether
the law allowed for a determination of the prevailing conditions
in other countries.46 ' The Appellate Body emphasized that an-
other aspect bore heavily upon "any determination of justifiable
or unjustifiable discrimination.", 6' The Appellate Body consid-
ered the failure of the United States to engage the complaining
Members and other shrimp-exporting Members in "serious,
across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and con-
servation of sea turtles before enforcing the import prohibition
against the shrimp exports of those Members."' The Shrimp-
Turtle Panel Report and the Appellate Body Report noted that
the United States did negotiate the Inter-American Convention
for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles (the Inter-
American Convention), a regional international agreement,
which was concluded in 1996 between the United States, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.4 64 In finding
Section 609 discriminatory in its application, the Appellate Body
considered that the Inter-American Convention was negotiated
after the United States began to enforce Section 609 on a
worldwide basis and that similar agreements were not sought
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See id. para. 166.
462. Id.
463. See Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 166.
464. See Id., para. 169; Panel Report on United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 7.56 (May 15, 1998) [here-
inafter Panel Shrimp-Turtle Report].
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with other shrimp-exporting countries.4 15 "The unilateral char-
acter of the application of Section 609 heightens the disruptive
and discriminatory influence of the import prohibition and un-
derscores its unjustifiability."4 66 The Appellate Body suggests
that the Inter-American Convention provided convincing evi-
dence that "an alternative course of action was reasonably open
to the United States for securing the legitimate policy goal of its
measure, a course of action other than unilateral and non-
consensual procedures in the import prohibition under Section69" 467
The Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body determined that the
failure of the United States to negotiate a consensual interna-
tional cooperative agreement on shrimp-trawling methods con-
stituted unjustifiable discrimination. The Appellate Body
noted that WTO Members have sanctioned international con-
sensus agreements as the most effective multilateral solution
for global problems.4 69  This strongly evidences that interna-
tional consensus agreements, especially those open for signature
by all countries, are presumptively not discriminatory. The KP
is open to all countries on a non-discriminatory basis without
any prerequisite entry requirements to further ensure its con-
sistency with WTO obligations. 7 0 Furthermore, unlike the uni-
lateral action of the United States with respect to protecting sea
turtles under Section 609, the KP developed through full and
open international discourse.4 7 ' Regardless of whether the KP
465. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, paras. 166, 168. The
Appellate Body considered the latter particularly important given the migrating na-
ture of sea turtles, stressing that the "very policy objective of the measure, de-
mand[ed] concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of many countries whose wa-
ters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations." Id. para. 168.
466. Id. para. 172.
467. Id. para. 171.
468. See id. para. 149.
469. Id. para. 168 (citing Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment,
WT/CTE/1, para. 171, (Nov. 12, 1996), which was incorporated as Section VII of the
Report of the General Council to the 1996 Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN/2, 26
November 1996). Although the KP pertains to a human health concern, it is closely
analogous to an environmental protection measure in that the analysis with respect
to WTO obligations is the same under GATT Article XX (b) for both human health
measures and environmental protection measures. Id. Additionally, measures di-
rected at protecting environmental and human health would likely share certain
commonalities due to the altruistic nature or effect of such measures. Id.
470. Essential Elements of an International Scheme for Certification for Rough
Diamonds, Kimberley Process Working Document 10/2001 § VI(10) [hereinafter KP
Working Doc. 10/2001]; see also KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § VI (8).
471. See supra notes 5, 266 and accompanying text.
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will be perfected immediately upon implementation, devoid of
any safe havens for conflict diamond traders, the initiative is
the result of the concerted effort of a substantial number of sov-
ereign nations.472 WTO Members have notably agreed that the
WTO agreements and other multilateral agreements are "repre-
sentative of efforts of the international community to pursue
shared goals and, in the development of a mutually supportive
relationship between them, due respect must be afforded to
both."473 The Shrimp-Turtle Panel observed that, "[t]he negotia-
tion of a multilateral agreement or action under multilaterally
defined criteria is clearly a possible way to avoid threatening
the multilateral trading system.4 74
The multilateral nature of the KP removes the initiative, or
the implementing legislation of Participants, from challenges of
arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions on trade, because the
KP is open for the signature of all countries. 7  An arbitrary re-
striction is one that is decisive, but unreasoned, without consid-
• • - 476
eration of principles, circumstances, or significance. The KP is
unlikely to constitute an arbitrary restriction because the
scheme has been carefully reasoned, debated, and negotiated
over a period of two years.477 During this time, tremendous con-
sideration has been given to the circumstances necessitating the
blocking measure and the consequences of failing to implement
the measure."' Moreover, the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) provides that technical
regulations "shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an un-
necessary obstacle to international trade" when the regulations
are adopted for legitimate purposes that further the objectives of
GATT and are in accordance with applicable international stan-
472. See supra notes 5, 266 and accompanying text.
473. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 427, para. 168 (citing Re-
port of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1, para. 171 (Nov. 12,
1996)), which was incorporated as Section VII of the Report of the General Council
to the 1996 Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN/2 (Nov. 26, 1996).
474. Panel Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 464, para. 7.55.
475. Whereas the WTO Appellate Body noted that few countries were provided
the opportunity to negotiate international agreements with the United States re-
garding the protection of sea turtles and concomitant shrimp-trawling procedures,
see supra note 465 and accompanying text, participation in the KP is "open on a
global, non-discriminatory basis to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the re-
quirements of [the] scheme." KP Working Doc. 10/2001, supra note 470, § VI (8).
476. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 436, at 138.
477. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 5, 266 and accompanying text.
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dards.479 Where such technical regulations are required, Mem-
bers shall apply the relevant international standard if one exists
or if its establishment is imminent. 80 At least thirty-five coun-
tries and the U.N. have agreed that the KP is required."" While
progress has been slow, the KP is on the verge of becoming an
international standard-its completion is imminent. The KP
is not, therefore, contrary to WTO obligations, but is wholly con-
sistent with the WTO model for resolving trans-boundary dis-
putes as set forth in the Shrimp-Turtle case.483
C. DOES THE KP QUALIFY AS A SECURITY EXCEPTION UNDER
GATT, ARTICLE XX
The implementing legislation of KP Participants may con-
stitute technical regulations within the meaning of GATT Arti-
cle XI. However, such regulations are necessary for interna-
tional security and do not conflict with GATT/WTO objectives.
GATT Article XXI provides WTO Members with a safeguard ex-
ception for matters of national security. This exception allows
479. TBT Agreement, supra note 415. The TBT Agreement promotes harmoni-
zation of international standards. Id.
480. Id. para. 2.4. The TBT Agreement stipulates that applicable international
standards should be followed, unless it would be an ineffective or inappropriate, "for
instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental
technological problems." Id.
481. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
482. See KP Working Doc. 1/2002, supra note 5, § VI (22) ("[I]t is the intention of
the Participants to start the full implementation [of the KP] simultaneously by the
end of 2002.").
483. See supra notes 466-65 and accompanying text.
484. GATT, supra note 29, Article XXI provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any Member to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which
they are derived;
(ii)relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried
on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military es-
tablishment;
(iii)taken in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions; or
(c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
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WTO Members to escape their obligations under the GATT in
order to take actions to protect their "essential security inter-
ests" and to act pursuant to their obligations under the U.N.
Charter "for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity."4 5 Article XXI embodies the concept of sovereignty and re-
spects the right of all nations to protect themselves from exter-
nal threats.8 For this reason, Article XXI is written broadly
and allows nations greater latitude than the general exceptions
under Article XX.4 17  The legislative history of GATT reveals
that the drafters intentionally separated the security exceptions
from Article XX general exceptions, which rendered the qualify-
ing language and two-tiered analysis of Article XX's chapeau in-
applicable to the security exceptions.4 8
Although Article XXI has formally been invoked on only
rare occasions, nations have great latitude under this exception
and many commentators fear abuse of the provision.4 9 Without
identifiable standards, the security exception is vulnerable to
broad construction that renders it susceptible to abuse.49 ° An
overly broad interpretation could lead to an unacceptable im-
balance between national sovereignty and the multilateral sys-
tem of global economic governance.4 1 Such concerns, however,
are not applicable with respect to the KP. The multilateral na-
ture of the KP renders it devoid of unilateral power-based bully-
ing. It fits squarely within the good-faith meaning of Article
XXI. 492 The WTO is committed to reducing barriers to legitimate
international peace and security.
485. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XXI(c).
486. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of
the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Estab-
lishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
413, 421 (2001) (citing Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An
Analysis of GATT's Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 558, 560 (1991)).
487. Id. (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 133 (June 27)).
488. Id. at 422 (citing JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
537-38 (1969)); see also Hahn, supra note 486, at 566-67.
489. Cann, supra note 486, at 424.
490. Id. at 414.
491. Id.
492. Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process II, Ministerial Statement, Conclu-
sions of the Ministerial Meeting Gaborone (Nov. 29, 2001), at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (noting the devastating impact on regional stabil-
ity caused by conflicts fueled by the trade of conflict diamonds and the "obligations
placed upon states by the United Nations Charter regarding the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security").
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trade and opening markets.493 The KP is designed to foster last-
ing peace in Africa, which will facilitate the legitimate trade in
diamonds and open African markets.494
Prosperity and legitimate trade cannot thrive amidst po-
litical unrest and economic instability. Multinational corpora-
tions "seek stable markets and prosperous trading partners,
both of which are likely in countries at peace." 495 U.N. peace-
keeping is a critical agent that has subdued the violence and
transitioned these countries from civil unrest to functioning
states.496 Many countries developed stable economies and grow-
ing markets in areas once patrolled by U.N. peacekeepers.497
Laws passed by Participants to implement the KP will be
insulated from WTO challenge as actions taken pursuant to the
U.N. Charter. The U.N. called for Members to develop accept-
able minimum standards for rough diamond certification, pur-
suant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to address interna-
tional peace and security threats caused by the illicit diamond
trade. 49 ' The international community agrees that U.N. sanc-
tions left loopholes allowing the conflict diamond trade to con-
tinue relatively unfettered. However, closing those loopholes
means that non-participating WTO Members would be excluded
from the diamond trade.499
The U.N. resolution on the conflict diamonds specifically
recognizes that the certification scheme would enhance the im-
plementation of relevant Security Council resolutions containing
sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds. °° Although the KP
is more complex than targeted sanctions, it is equally consistent
with the purpose of the U.N. 50' It is designed to foster peace and
493. See generally Final Act, supra note 29, Preamble.
494. U.N. Doc. A/56/502, supra note 8.
495. SANDRINE TESNER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND BUSINESS: A PARTNERSHIP
RECOVERED 58-59 (2000) (quoting Richard McCormick, former CEO of U.S. West
and President of the International Chamber of Commerce).
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56
(2001).
499. See supra note 27 for a list of WTO Members that are diamond traders or
producers which have not yet agreed to participate in the KP.
500. Press Release, U.N. Gen. Assembly, General Assembly Urges Finalization
of International Certification Scheme for Rough diamonds: Success of 'Kimberley
Process' a Matter of Life and Death For Southern Africa, Says Botswana as Assem-
bly Adopts Text on Conflict Diamonds, U.N. Doc. GA 10011 (Mar. 13, 2002), at
http://www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2002/GA10011.doc.htm.
501. The U.N. Charter sets forth four purposes of the U.N.: (1) to maintain in-
ternational peace and security; (2) to develop friendly relations among nations; (3) to
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security, to promote economic and social progress, and to sup-
port development through multilateral cooperation.0 2 Moreover,
the U.N. is advantaged in negotiating collective values within
the framework of multilateralism. 3 The U.N. is built on the
principle of equality for all nations; this principle ideally situ-
ates the U.N. to negotiate universally applicable principles for
all states. 4 The U.N. established norms to "promote values
central to global commerce."0 5 With a key role to maintain in-
ternational peace and security, the U.N. provides an alternative
venue for the enforcement of such values as human rights and
environmental responsibility. °6 The U.N.'s resolutions alone,
endorsing and encouraging Members to abide by KP minimum
standards, provide an adequate legal underpinning for Members
to justify their implementing legislation.
V. POTENTIAL FOR KP EFFECTIVENESS: IS ALL OR
NOTHING POLITICS NECESSARY?
A. THE KP AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MEASURE
Diamonds have been more of a curse than a blessing for
Angola, Sierra Leone, the DRC, and their neighbors.0 7 "Unlike
copper, cobalt, and oil that must be mined on an industrial
scale, requiring substantial investment and stability at the site,
alluvial diamonds can be mined in war zones with little or no
technology."508 The ease with which diamonds can be mined en-
abled a shadow economy to develop within the context of eco-
nomic collapse, corrupt government, and military strife.509 Find-
ing a solution that will effectively end the conflict diamond trade
is as correspondingly difficult as resolving the very economic col-
lapse, corruption, and strife that enabled this brutal trade to
cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human
rights, and (4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. U.N. CHARTER
art. 1, paras. 1-4. The Kimberly Process is consistent with the purpose of the U.N.
The process is designed to foster peace and security and as a multilateral effort.
502. Press Release, General Assembly Urges Finalization, supra note 500.
503. TESNER, supra note 495, at 56.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 55.
506. Id. at 53.
507. Dietrich, supra note 22, at 2.
508. Id.
509. Id.
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burgeon.
The security efforts within diamond-producing countries
will be crucial to the success of the KP. Keeping diamond areas
out of the hands of rebels will be a significant step toward eco-
nomic growth in these countries.510 An adequate and stable
economy will lead to less corruption in government and greater
political stability.5"' If the legitimate governments of the coun-
tries can establish and maintain adequate control of the mines,
they will reap the full benefit of the natural wealth within their
territories through tax revenues. Most importantly, these reve-
nues will foster the development of infrastructures needed to
support a stable economy and the human services necessary to
support the populace.512 Security controls at the diamond mines
will also increase security and stability in the region thereby
fostering an increase in external finance investment within
these countries.5 3
Without adequate security measures at the mines, illicit
rough diamonds will continue to find a market. Once polished,
conflict diamonds will continue to enter legitimate commerce
undetected.514 Some have suggested that enabling bad govern-
ments to obtain greater power over the diamond trade will sim-
ply deprive innocent artisanal miners of their only means of
making a living for their families.1 5 "The alternative, how-
ever-a free for all in which illicit diamonds flow with impunity
across borders, evading tax and funding violence-is not a vi-
able option."" 6
The burden of bringing about a successful global certifica-
tion scheme cannot be placed on the producing countries
alone.517 As these countries struggle with severe humanitarian
~11crises and fledgling peace processes, 5 the international com-
munity must maintain its commitment to the scheme by provid-
ing significant aid and technical assistance."9 Skeptics of the
KP argue that the measure's success hinges on the integrity and
commitment of the major diamond trading centers, such as Bel-
510. See supra part I.D.
511. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
512. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 181-82, 186 and accompanying text.
514. See COOK, supra note 200, at 12.
515. Dietrich, supra note 22, at 13.
516. Id.
517. See supra notes 158, 185, 190-91 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 76-79, 120-24 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 74-77, 120-23, 143, 145-47, 151-59 and accompanying text.
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gium and Israel, which may place the KP in a precarious posi-
tion.520 The system will be largely reliant on the authorities in
these countries to scrutinize carefully all imported diamonds to
ensure that illegal gems are not slipped into the stream of com-
merce. 12' Given that eighty percent of the world's diamond are
bought and sold in Antwerp, questions arise about the effective-
ness of current Belgian diamond regulations.522 Critics claim
that Belgian regulations are not consistently enforced and cus-
toms agents screen flights from Africa with a "casual eye."523 In-
siders have observed that Antwerp importers can simply claim
that a newly arrived shipment is from a given country, even
when no flights or other shipments have arrived from that coun-
try. Although EU members agree that the KP will be imple-
mented uniformly among them, each nation will be responsible
for administering the regulations and punishments for viola-
tions 52 ' The necessity of integrity and commitment to the com-
prehensive implementation of the scheme is equally applicable
to all Participants.
The most accurate indices of the integrity of the certifica-
tion scheme will be the statistics measuring the annual diamond
production, the importing figures, and exporting figures of each
Participant.526  The illegitimate diamond trade is evident in
Guinea's official export statistics.527 Between 1995 and 1999,
Guinea officially exported to Belgium 1.45 million carats, valued
520. McGreal, supra note 253.
521. Id.
522. Elizabeth Bryant, Antwerp and Dirty Diamond Rumors, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, Mar. 7, 2002.
523. Id.
524. Id. (quoting Christian Deitrich, an African diamond analyst at Antwerp's
International Peace Information Service).
525. Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 26. On August 8,
2002, the European Commission, adopted a proposal for a new EU regulation that
would exceed KP requirements. Id. The proposed regulation states that "for pur-
poses of the certification scheme, the Community will be considered as one entity
with no internal borders." Id; see also Associated Press Newswires, EU Head Office
Proposes Europe-wide Plan To Stop Flow of Conflict Diamonds Into Europe, Aug. 8,
2002. Existing EU regulations do not require re-export certifications for diamonds
transported between EU members. TAMM, supra note 31, at 28.
526. See KP Working Document 10/2001, supra note 470, Annex III (stating that
"[R]eliable and comparable data on the production and the international trade in
rough diamonds are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the certifi-
cation scheme, and particularly for identifying any irregularities or anomalies which
could indicate that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade.").
527. Lansana Gberie, Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the
Potential for Wider Catastrophe, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA (2001), at 8, avail-
able at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org.
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at $133.5 million, although Belgium officially imported 2.9 mil-
lion carats valued at $461.3 million.528 If diamond producing
and trading countries maintain adequate information about
their diamonds' characteristics and the quantity produced, these
statistics should provide a certain degree of transparency as to
the effectiveness of national legislation and the KP overall.529
The KP transshipment policy, which will allow the trans-
shipment of rough diamonds without inspection or verification
of data with exporting authorities, is perhaps even more threat-
ening to the success of the measure."O This may lead to ques-
tionable procedures and encourage countries to turn a blind eye
to illicit shipments traversing their borders. The international
community should not assume that rebels and terrorists would
not have access to those shipments during transport.531 Such ac-
cess might enable conflict diamond traders to conduct their ille-
gal transactions within the territory of a KP Participant without
detection at the borders.
For example, if shipments of conflict diamonds exported
from an African country to the United States by way of Canada
are not examined by the Canadian government upon entry into
Canada, the shipment could be sold while transiting the coun-
try. The proceeds of the conflict diamonds could be laundered
and the diamonds could be re-exported as Canadian diamonds
and safely imported into the United States. The certification
scheme would be nullified. With respect to the EU, this trans-
shipment loophole poses an even greater threat to KP effective-
ness. With the bulk of the world's rough diamonds initially im-
ported into Belgium, a stringent chain-of-custody warranty for
shipments transiting EU countries is essential.532 Moreover, the
KP's transshipment policy could pose a great dilemma for coun-
tries choosing to stringently inspect diamond shipments enter-
ing their borders, regardless of whether the shipment is only
transiting the country. Such a full-bore policy could lead to po-
litical and trade strife or a WTO challenge, if an exporting coun-
try felt targeted by the policy. 3 This strengthens the argument
that a strong and unified policy should be implemented globally.
The KP is intended to operate as a system of national
528. Id.
529. See supra notes 200-23, 317-19, 324 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
532. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
533. See supra Part IV.
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laws. 534 The KP can work only to the extent that each country
vigorously enforces the ban on the conflict diamond trade at its
own borders.535 If loopholes are not carefully scrutinized and
rectified, the certification scheme could provide a false sense of
security for both the governments and citizens (i.e. consumers)
of Participants, while giving those with vested interests in the
diamond industry an adequate public relations scheme.3 6
B. THE KP AS AN "INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AGREEMENT"
The KP is not a treaty, but a political agreement.537  As
such, it provides only a framework regarding what Participants
"should" do to implement a national scheme with "recommenda-
tions" for enhanced controls.538 This, in many ways, is the fun-
damental flaw of the agreement. Without the binding force of
international law, the failings of Participants are not legally en-
forceable. 539 The GAO recommended in June 2002 that the U.S.
Department of State work with Participants to revise the certifi-
cation scheme by including "a reasonable control environment,
risk assessment, internal controls, information sharing and
monitoring. Without a legally binding treaty, complete with
a monitoring and enforcement mechanism, the KP may be no
more binding than a nod and a handshake. While the GAO's as-
sessment of the scheme's flaws are astute, developing an agree-
ment with over thirty-five sovereign nations is no easy feat.54'
In comments regarding the GAO's report, the State De-
partment noted that the GAO had not sufficiently considered
the political commitments the Participants achieved through
the KP.542 The statement alternatively argued that it was "more
appropriate to focus on the Kimberley Process scheme as a dy-
namic effort to reconcile competing priorities rather than assess
the scheme against a set of accountability measures."43 Al-
though the State Department concurred with the GAO as to the
inadequacies of the scheme's accountability measures, it did not
534. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 249-59, 269-73 and accompanying text.
537. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
539. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
540. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 22.
541. See supra Part II.C.
542. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 23.
543. Id.
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believe that such "additional controls could be realistically nego-
tiated prior to the scheme's launch."44
Weaknesses in the Working Document are evident. As the
Swiss delegation emphasized, an initial global understanding
for the control of rough diamonds is essential.545 Closing loop-
holes and resolving other difficulties can be corrected in time as
they are revealed. Certainly, international agreements are not
without flaws.46 The Working Document provides for annual
reviews and a comprehensive review mechanism.547 These re-
views should present an adequate opportunity for KP Partici-
pants to air grievances and correct deficiencies. The horrors of
conflict diamonds are more inclined to be minimized through the
speedy use of the certification scheme, especially given the an-
nual reviews that will facilitate the continual improvement of
5481the scheme and address weaknesses as they may appear.
Unlike Nineteenth Century treaties, which were judged
based on a snapshot in time, the KP and other modern treaties
544. Id. The Department of the Treasury also disagreed with the GAO recom-
mendation, but for different reasons. Id. at 24. "Treasury believes that such steps
[if taken by the State Department] would be unlikely to increase enforcement and
would substantially increase costs and divert enforcement resources." Id. The GAO
noted, however, that Treasury did not provide an explanation as to why strength-
ened controls would fail to increase effectiveness or how such improvements in ac-
countability would increase and divert enforcement resources. Id. at 24.
545. See OTHER FACETS No. 2, supra note 257, at 2.
546. For example, the UNESCO Convention 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M.
289, which seeks to protect artworks during peacetime by curbing the illicit trade of
cultural property, has been "widely viewed as weak, cumbersome and an unenforce-
able jumble of rhetoric." Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends In The Flourishing
International Trade of Art and Antiquities: Restitutio In Integrum And Possessio
Animo Ferundi ILucrandi, 14 DICKINSON J. OF INT'L L. 31, 44 (1995) (citing Nina R.
Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does the Unidroit
Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Con-
vention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 469, 478 (1994)). The Single Convention, opened
for signature March 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force 13 December
1964) provides strict provisions for international drug trafficking, but states' obliga-
tions to enforce drug use provisions are discretionary, providing only that signato-
ries must "take some form of action" to deter the use, reflecting "differing national
attitudes." Ian Malkin, Establishing Supervised Injecting Facilities: A Responsible
Way to Help Minimuse Harm, 25 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 680, 716 n.207 (Dec.
2001). This convention and the 1972 and 1988 Protocols to this convention do not
articulate how treatment and rehabilitation should be accomplished, nor do they
indicate the measures that should be taken to effectively achieve such objectives. Id.
at 715-16.
547. KP Working Doc. 10/2001, supra note 470, § VI(20).
548. See Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 20, para. 5, at 2 (stating
that "[s]uch a certification scheme will make a major contribution to bringing an end
to these [African] conflicts"). EU members have agreed that the KP will be imple-
mented uniformly among them. Id.
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and political agreements should be viewed as initiating ongoing549
processes. Arguably, the KP fits within the developing
"managerial form of treaty-making," which is characterized by
the implementation of a framework for the future, not just when
the treaty is initially concluded. 550 Agreements that establish a
framework for the future, such as the KP, are essentially "liv-
ing" treaties or agreements.5 ' "[W]hether or not they resort to
harder forms of enforcement such as binding dispute settle-
ment," they often deepen over time creating a legislative enter-
prise capable of continuous improvement responsive to the par-
ties' needs and advancements.552
The KP represents a new way to address a problem. It was
prompted by NGOs and initiated by African countries, where
conflict diamonds are most hindersome to life and prosperity.
Southern African Development Community,553 together with the
unsolicited assistance of various NGOs, managed to build a con-
sensus in the diamond industry,554 the international community,
and among the U.N. members that a global certification scheme
for rough diamonds is necessary to protect human life and to
maintain international peace and security."55 Although the KP
agreement may be written as a political agreement, without an
enforcement mechanism, it still represents a positive initiative
that stands to contribute to the urgently needed peace and secu-
rity of the war-torn countries of Angola, Sierra Leone, and the
DRC, as well as their neighbors.556 Further, the rest of civil so-
ciety will profit from the interdiction of the conflict diamond
trade that has fueled both civil wars and terrorism and possibly
from the development of an expanded and diversified market in
Africa.5 7
549. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
213, 221-22 (2002).
550. "The twelve protocols of the European system of Human Rights, the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Uruguay
Round are all products of managerial regimes and are characteristic of how they
function." Id. at 222.
551. Id. at 221.
552. Id.
553. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
556. See supra Part L.A-C.
557. See supra Part I.D.
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CONCLUSION
The KP certification scheme is a multilateral trade-blocking
initiative that is also a U.N.-based trade measure. It evidences
the central role that non-trade organizations, especially the
U.N., can play in resolving international issues that have a
bearing on trade. As the WTO develops and its role is further
refined, it may become evident that the WTO is not the proper
venue for regulatory enforcement schemes, nor the proper hub
for all trade-related harmonization efforts.558 It would be a mis-
take to use the WTO as a straightjacket to prevent the interna-
tional community from taking action to resolve legitimate global
issues such as security threats, humanitarian crises, or envi-
ronmental concerns.
Although the certification system is not a fail-safe guaran-
tee against the trade of conflict diamonds, it is a first step to-
ward preventing the mass looting of African natural resources
to finance underworld objectives. Unmonitored transshipment
procedures and the scheme's reliance on the effectiveness of the
national laws of each Participant may create loopholes that un-
dermine the scheme's overall effectiveness. Nonetheless, the KP
serves as an excellent prototype to demonstrate the viability of
international consensus agreements as feasible alternatives to
address international issues bearing on trade. The requirement
of universal implementation does not render the KP inconsis-
tent with the WTO Agreements, as the scheme is open for all to
participate. If implemented effectively, international consensus
agreements sponsored by organizations other than the WTO
may prove an effective solution for minimizing the looting of
other primary commodity exports known to finance war and ter-
rorism. As the 107th Congress reaches an end without conflict
diamond trade legislation, the ball is beginning to drop for the
targeted December 2002 global implementation date for the KP.
558. Bernard Hoekman, Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Devel-
opment, §2.2, at 14, at http://www.worldbankgroup.org (last modified Nov. 16,
2001).
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